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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(i) Utah Code Annotated (as amended, 1992) as an 
Appeal from final Orders granting a Petition for Modification of a 
Divorce Decree in the Third Judicial District Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the Findings of Fact relative to a "change in 
circumstances" and "the best interests of the children" be set aside as 
not reflecting the weight of evidence or a mistake having been made. 
The Findings of Fact will be set aside only if they are clearly 
erroneous, meaning that they are in conflict with the clear weight of 
evidence, or if the Court of Appeals has a "definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made." Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah App. 1989); Haqan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991); 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in concluding 
that a change of circumstances occurred and the best interests of the 
children would be served by changing permanent custody. Conclusions of 
Law will be reviewed by the Court of Appeals on a correction of error 
standard, affording no particular deference to the Trial Court. State 
v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App. 1990). A Trial Court's 
decision concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 
984 (Utah App. 1989); Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 
1991). 
3. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by Ordering 
Carolyne Sigg to pay Henry Sigg's attorney's fees regarding the Petition 
for Modification. A correction of error standard affording no 
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particular deference to the Trial Court is used in reviewing Conclusions 
of Law by the Court of Appeals. State v. Bobo, supra* A Trial Court's 
decision concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Myers v. Myers, supra.; 
Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra. 
4. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by Ordering 
Carolyne Sigg to pay Henry Sigg's attorney's fees and related expenses 
of a Colorado criminal action. State v. Bobo, supra. A Trial Court's 
decision concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Myers v. Myers, supra.; 
Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra. 
5. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by Ordering 
Carolyne Sigg to pay all of the custody evaluator's fee. State v. Bobo, 
supra. A Trial Court's decision concerning modification of a Decree of 
Divorce will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Myers v. 
Myers, supra.; Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra. 
6. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by arbitrarily 
Ordering Carolyne Sigg to be solely responsible for one-third of her day 
care costs and equally dividing the balance between the parties. State 
v. Bobo, supra. A Trial Court's decision concerning modification of a 
Decree of Divorce will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 
Myers v. Myers, supra.; Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, supra. 
7. Should the Findings of Fact regarding cohabitation be set 
aside as not reflecting the weight of evidence or showing a clear 
mistake has been made. The Findings of Fact will be set aside only if 
they are clearly erroneous, meaning that they are in conflict with the 
clear weight of evidence, or if the Court of Appeals has a "definite and 
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firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Jense v. Jense, supra.; 
Haqan v. Haqan, supra; Crouse v. Crouse, supra. 
8. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by terminating 
alimony in February, 1993, based upon Carolyne Sigg's alleged 
"cohabitation". State v. Bobo, supra. A Trial Court's decision 
concerning modification of a Decree of Divorce will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion. Myers v. Myers, supra.; Cumminqs v. 
Cumminqs, supra. 
9. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by not granting 
Appellant's Motion to Continue Trial based upon late filing of the 
custody evaluation. A Motion to Continue Trial was made June 14, 1994, 
(Rec. 633-634) a Motion to Continue Trial and Objection to the Trial 
Proceeding was made at Trial and denied (Tr. 4; 78)*. The Court of 
Appeals will review the denial of the Motion on a "prejudicial error" 
standard. Yates v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 887 (Ariz. App. 1978) 
* For purposes of this Brief, reference to the abbreviation "Tr." shall 
mean the page number of the Transcript of Hearing, June 14-15, 1994, and reference to 
the abbreviation "Rec." shall mean the page number of the general record from the Third 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A Decree of Divorce was entered April 7, 1991, divorcing 
Carolyne and Henry Sigg. (Rec. 356-66; Addendum, Ex. 1). Henry Sigg 
filed a Petition for Modification on November 24, 1993. (Rec. 475-89) 
On January 12, 1994, Carolyne Sigg filed an Order to Show Cause relating 
to Henry Sigg's failure to make required payments under the Decree of 
Divorce (Rec. 574-75) which was granted in part by Order dated May 12, 
1994, which further reserved the issue of alimony, day care expenses, 
travel costs, attorney's fees, and contempt for Trial. (Rec. 623-25) 
On January 19, 1994, Henry Sigg moved for temporary orders pending 
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trial, including appointment of a custody evaluator, which was granted 
in part on February 15, 1994, reserving for Trial issues terminating 
alimony, contempt and attorney's fees. (Rec. 579-84) The parties 
conducted Discovery. On April 24, 1994, the Court scheduled trial for 
June 14, 1994. (Rec. 604-05) On June 9, 1994, Carolyne Sigg moved to 
continue the trial setting based upon not having received the custody 
evaluation and Discovery. (Rec. 633-34; Addendum, Ex.2) After a two day 
Trial, June 14-15, 1994, before the Honorable David S. Young, the Court 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Rec. 671-690; Addendum, 
Ex.3) on September 29, 1994 which modified the Decree of Divorce 
transferring custody of the two minor children from Carolyne Sigg to 
Henry Sigg, terminating alimony based upon cohabitation, awarding Henry 
Sigg $14,000 in attorney's fees for the modification proceeding, $1,000 
in attorney's fees and other expenses incurred by Henry Sigg in a 
Colorado criminal action, Ordering Carolyne Sigg to pay all of the 
custody evaluator's fee in excess of $3,000 and granting Carolyne Sigg's 
Order to Show Cause to the extent of a portion of the day care fee. An 
amended Decree of Divorce was entered September 29, 1994. (Rec. 693-700; 
Addendum, Ex.4) Notice of Appeal was filed October 26, 1994. 
FACTS 
1. Henry and Carolyne Sigg were married September 8, 1984, 
at her parent's home in Auckland, New Zealand. (Tr.238) 
2. The Sigg's daughter Nicola was born March 4, 1985; 
Carolyne Sigg has been her primary care taker since birth. (Tr.238-239) 
3. The Sigg's daughter Lindsay was born January 6, 1989; 
Carolyne Sigg has been her primary care taker since birth. (Tr. 239) 
Three days after Lindsay's birth, Henry Sigg left on a ten (10) day 
4 
river trip. (Tr.240) Since the parties final separation in July, 1990, 
Carolyne Sigg has been Lindsay and Nicola's primary custodial parent. 
4. Henry Sigg physically abused Carolyne Sigg both during 
and after their marriage and separation. (Tr.245) 
5. In January 1991, the Park City Attorney filed assault and 
battery charges against Henry Sigg after he attacked his wife. (Tr.246) 
6. Henry Sigg regularly yelled at Carolyne Sigg, used foul 
and abusive language both during and after their marriage (Tr.245) and 
has threatened Carolyne Sigg on several occasions (Tr.247). 
7. Carolyne Sigg has seen Henry Sigg use cocaine and 
marijuana (Tr.242) and Henry Sigg has admitted to being a recreational 
drug user prior to their divorce. (Tr.243) Carolyne Sigg believes this 
was the primary reason for the divorce. (Tr.244) Henry Sigg denies 
currently using drugs (Tr.346). 
8. Carolyne Sigg is and was physically afraid of Henry Sigg 
based upon his physical abuse and verbal menacing. (Tr.247) 
9. After a two (2) day trial, the parties were divorced 
April 7, 1991. The Decree of Divorce, (record 356-366; Addendum Ex.1) 
awards Carolyne Sigg permanent custody of the parties' daughters, Nicola 
and Lindsay, and in pertinent part states: 
"2. The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the minor children of the 
parties. There shall be reserved in the Defendant 
reasonable rights of visitation which will be 
consistent with those rights of visitation which 
have been exercised by the Defendant during the 
pendency of these proceedings, every other weekend, 
every Tuesday and Thursday evening, and such other 
times as the parties may agree. In the event the 
Plaintiff should elect to reside in New Zealand or 
elsewhere outside of the state of Utah, the 
Defendant shall be entitled to exercise extended 
visitation for up to sixty (60) days each year, 
which visitation shall take into consideration the 
children's school schedules. If the Defendant does 
exercise extended visitation because of Plaintiff's 
move as herein set out, the Defendant is entitled 
to exercise visitation in two separate segments, at 
his option. 
3. In the event the Plaintiff does not move 
outside the state of Utah, the Defendant shall be 
entitled to four weeks of visitation during the 
summer for the purpose of exercising vacation. In 
the event the Defendant does not exercise vacation 
during the summer, the Plaintiff shall have rights 
of visitation with the children which are 
reciprocal to those herein reserved in the 
Defendant. If the Defendant does elect to take 
vacation with the children during extended 
visitation, he shall not take the children outside 
of the United States without the Plaintiff's 
consent. The Plaintiff shall not unreasonably 
withhold her consent, and if she does, the matter 
may be submitted to the Court for determination. 
4. The parties shall freely and openly communicate 
regarding actions to be taken in the best interests 
of the children. There shall be reserved in the 
Defendant the right to receive and review the 
schooling and academic records of the children, all 
medical and dental records, all social and 
religious records of importance. In those 
instances where duplicate records are not provided 
by the children's school of medical provider, the 
Plaintiff will forward copies of those records to 
the Defendant, such as the children's report cards 
and parent-teacher conferences and other regularly 
scheduled school activities of the children. The 
parties shall take no action to interfere in the 
enhancement of the other's relationship with the 
children, nor any action which may be construed in 
any respect as derogatory toward the other parent 
in that relationship. In the accommodation and 
exercise of visitation, the parties will take into 
the consideration of the children's needs to be in 
attendance at activities and shall give close 
attention to those activities and facilitate the 
children's participation therein. 
5. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff $344 
per month per child as child support for a total of 
$688 per month. Child support will be paid in one 
lump sum on or before the 5th day of each month 
through the Clerk of the Court. Child support 
shall be paid by the Defendant until such time as 
the minor children reach the age of eighteen (18) 
or graduate from high school with their normal 
graduating class, whichever shall occur later. 
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8. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $500 per month as and for alimony, which alimony 
shall terminate as provided by law or upon further 
Order of this Court. Alimony is to be paid in one 
lump sum on or before the 5th day of each month 
through the Clerk of the Court." 
10. After the divorce, Carolyne Sigg resided in Park City 
where visitation regularly occurred according to the Decree. (Tr.246-
247) 
11. The Divorce Decree contemplates that Carolyne Sigg may 
return to New Zealand either for a visit or to permanently live, or she 
may reside outside of the state, in which case Henry Sigg is granted 
"sixty (60) days visitation each year". 
12. Henry Sigg married Amy Wilking, with whom he had an 
affair, shortly after the divorce. 
13. In the summer of 1991, Carolyne Sigg listed her home for 
sale and informed Henry Sigg she planned eventually to return to New 
Zealand. (Tr.247-248) A large sign was posted in front of her house 
indicating that it was for sale. 
14. The home sold in August, 1992. In the weeks immediately 
preceding the sale, Carolyne Sigg discussed with Henry Sigg closing 
dates for the home sale and informed Henry Sigg that, as soon as the 
house was sold, she would travel to Boulder, Colorado, Disneyland, and 
then to visit her parents in New Zealand. (Tr.249; 318-320) Henry Sigg 
was aware of where Carolyne Sigg's parents resided in Auckland, 
Australia and had her parents telephone number. (Tr.320) 
15. Henry Sigg testified that Carolyne Sigg never informed 
him she was returning to New Zealand with the children after sale of the 
home (Tr.29-30; 175-176) and the first time he discovered her 
whereabouts was by telephoning Vic Haynes in Boulder, Colorado. (Tr.39) 
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A man with whom Carolyne Sigg had stayed 5-6 days prior to travelling to 
New Zealand. (Tr. 223-24) 
16. Henry Sigg called Carolyne Sigg at her parent's home in 
Auckland, New Zealand within five to fifteen minutes of her initial 
arrival. (Tr.39; 250) Henry Sigg knew of the location of her parent's 
home. {Tr.178-179) 
17. According to Carolyne Sigg, she told Henry Sigg that she 
would be in New Zealand until New Years 1992, and wanted the children to 
get acquainted with her parents and make decisions about future. 
(Tr.250) 
18. Henry Sigg testified that he indicated he would be coming 
to New Zealand and Carolyn Sigg replied that he would not be welcome. 
(Tr.40) 
19. Carolyn Sigg testified that subsequent to her arrival in 
New Zealand, her daughters telephoned Henry Sigg every other week and he 
telephoned them on alternative weeks and Nicola and Lindsay often wrote 
him letters. (Tr.250-251) Henry Sigg denies the frequency of the 
contact and only admits talking with the daughters two to three times 
and receiving letters from them. (Tr.181) 
20. Henry Sigg indicated he would come to New Zealand first 
in September, then in October, and finally in November, but never stated 
a specific date for his arrival. (Tr.251) Ms. Sigg recalls discussing 
Christmas visitation with Mr. Sigg and discussing other visitation by 
telephone with Mr. Sigg. (Tr.326) 
21. Ms. Sigg resided with her parents for eight (8) weeks 
then moved to an apartment approximately 100 yards from her parent's 
residence in Auckland, New Zealand. (Tr.252; 321) 
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22. Henry Sigg arrived in New Zealand on November 4, 1992 and 
stayed five (5) weeks; the purpose of his trip was to affect visitation 
with his children. (Tr.40-41) 
23. When Henry Sigg arrived in New Zealand, Carolyn Sigg was 
on a trip with her father. (Tr.252) Ms. Sigg testified Henry Sigg did 
not contact her for visitation with the children but had hired an 
attorney prior to leaving the United States who filed a legal action 
against her. (Tr.255; 181-182) 
24. Mr. Sigg testified he had to hire a private investigator 
to locate Carolyn Sigg and his children since he did not know their 
whereabouts after they moved from her parent's home. (Tr.181) Carolyne's 
mother told Henry Sigg they moved and left no forwarding address. 
25. Mr. Sigg alleged that he tried to contact Carolyn Sigg 
when he arrived but she would not communicate with him; as a result, he 
hired an attorney to enforce the Divorce Decree under The Hague 
Convention. (Tr.42-43) 
26. As a result of the legal action, Carolyn Sigg hired an 
attorney and subsequently sought assistance from a Mediator to 
facilitate visitation. (Tr.253; 321-324) Carolyn Sigg requested 
supervised visitation because Henry Sigg had previously threatened to 
kidnap the children (Tr.254; 324-325) supervised visitation occurred for 
a period of two hours. (Tr.44-45) 
27. No visitation occurred again because Henry Sigg got angry 
at Carolyne Sigg while on a second visit and came across the table at 
Carolyn Sigg; the Mediator asked her to leave. (Tr.253,254; 45) 
28. The New Zealand Court held that there had been no 
violation of the Utah Divorce Decree by Carolyn Sigg (Tr.44; 183) and on 
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the day of the Court hearing, Mr. Sigg voluntarily departed New Zealand 
without notice. 
29. Vic Haynes visited Carolyn Sigg in New Zealand around 
Christmas. (Tr.3 2 6) 
30. Carolyn Sigg returned to Boulder, Colorado on February 7, 
1993; Lindsay and Nicola called their father on February 10, and 
February 14, 1993. Carolyn Sigg provided Henry Sigg with the telephone 
number where she and the children could be reached in Boulder, Colorado. 
(Tr.255) 
31. Carolyn Sigg stayed at Vic Haynes house for the first two 
weeks in Boulder, Colorado, then moved to her own condominium (Tr.256). 
Carolyn Sigg g e Henry Sigg the telephone number and address of her 
condominium whei„ she moved. The only phone in the home was her private 
line and she maintained no telephone answering machine, made no 
restrictions on when her children could talk with Henry Sigg and she 
occasionally spoke with Henry Sigg. (Tr.256; 187) Carolyn Sigg resided 
in her condominium for six (6) months from the end of February 1993, to 
the end of August 1993. (Tr.261) 
32. Regarding Nicola's school activities, during 1993, Mr. 
Sigg attended her baseball games, a school event entitled "Hawaii Day" 
and a year end concert. However, Mr. Sigg testified that Carolyn Sigg 
did not inform him of his daughter's school activities. (Tr.194-197) 
33. During the spring of 1993, Henry Sigg had the following 
visitation with Nicola and Lindsay: March 19-28; April 15-20; and May 
28-June 2. (Tr.92; 257-259) On all three occasions, Henry Sigg returned 
the girls late, sometimes up to two (2) days. (Tr.257-258) 
34. Carolyn Sigg testified that Henry Sigg does not notify 
her when he is returning the children in an untimely manner. (Tr. 192-
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194) Henry Sigg testified he always calls her if he is returning the 
girls late. 
35. During the summer of 1993, Henry Sigg had visitation for 
sixty-five (65) days through August 28, 1993, consistent with the 
visitation award contained in paragraph 2 of the Divorce Decree. (Tr.50; 
259) 
36. Since April 7, 1991, Henry Sigg has always received 
visitation granted by the Decree of Divorce and Carolyn Sigg has not 
been in violation of any Court Ordered visitation. (Tr.125; 259) 
37. During the summer of 1993, Henry Sigg arranged a visit 
with his family in Cape Cod; he testified that he requested that the 
children be returned five (5) days later than his sixty (60) days 
visitation, on August 28, and Carolyn Sigg refused to agree with the 
extended visitation. (Tr.49-53) Mr. Sigg further testified he provided 
Carolyn Sigg with an itinerary and telephone number where they could be 
reached. He returned the children five (5) days later than the 
scheduled visitation. 
38. Regarding the Cape Cod visit, Carolyn Sigg testified that 
Henry Sigg had not told her of the Cape Cod excursion but she had 
learned of the trip through her daughter and she had received no request 
from Henry Sigg to return them late. (Tr.259-260) Carolyn Sigg 
testified she received no telephone number or address for the children 
in Cape Cod and did not know the children would be returning late until 
two to three days after the scheduled visitation; as a result, she 
contacted the Boulder Police. (Tr.260; 327-330) 
39. Mr. Sigg testified he has received only sporadic reports 
from the children's school in Boulder, Colorado; no notices of parent-
teacher conferences; and only invoices from medical and dental health 
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care providers, (Tr.31-34) Carolyn Sigg testified that Nicola and 
Lindsay are quite healthy and rarely, if ever, need any medical 
assistance. (Tr.276) 
40. In August 1993, prior to the children's return home from 
the extended visit with their father, Carolyn Sigg and Vic Haynes 
purchased a home together in Boulder, Colorado. (Tr.261) 
41. The first telephone line they were able to install at 
their home was both a private and business line for Carolyn Sigg and Vic 
Haynes; as a result, they placed an answering machine which contained a 
message. (Tr.261-262; 35-36; 189-91; 147-148) A second telephone line 
was installed two months later at the beginning of November, 1993. 
(Tr.334) 
42. Henry Sigg objected to contacting the children through 
the telephone with an answering machine and in January 1994, offered to 
pay for a second private line. (Tr.35-36) 
43. Henry Sigg began leaving messages for Carolyn Sigg and 
their daughters using foul and abusive language and making a variety of 
threats against Carolyn Sigg as follows: 
a. He threatened to sue her; 
b. He threatened to have Vic Haynes charged with child 
molestation; 
c. He threatened to call the mortgage company and tell 
them that Vic Haynes and Carolyn Sigg had obtained a fraudulent loan; 
and 
d. He threatened that Carolyn Sigg and Vic Haynes would 
be very sorry. (Tr.262-263) 
44. Henry Sigg would call and leave several messages, hang up 
several times and leave messages for his daughters saying that Carolyn 
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Sigg was purposely trying to keep them from talking with their father. 
(Tr. 264) 
45. In the early fall, Henry Sigg would call "all hours of 
the day and night. Six o'clock in the morning, one o'clock at night." 
(Tr.264) Henry Sigg admits to foul and abusive language on the 
telephone and would not repeat the language he used on the telephone 
while testifying in Court. (Tr. 147-148; 189-191) 
46. The children have told their mother that Henry Sigg calls 
her a "bitch", an "asshole", and says that their mother speaks 
"bullshit". (Tr.287-289) 
47. As a result of calls at all hours of the day and night, 
the abusive language both with the children and with Carolyn Sigg, and 
to end Henry Sigg's frustration with calling when no one was home, 
Carolyn Sigg set up a schedule for calling Lindsay and Nicola on Monday 
and Friday nights and at Henry Sigg's request changed to Monday and 
Thursday nights at 7:00 p.m. (Tr.265) 
48. As a result of the telephone threats and verbal abuse, 
Vic Haynes filed a Complaint with the Boulder Police Department for 
telephone harassment and the Boulder Police contacted the Park City 
Police. (Tr.94) 
49. Carolyn Sigg testified that she tried to set up a 
Thanksgiving visitation through Henry Sigg's attorney, John Mason, since 
Henry Sigg continued to be verbally aggressive. (Tr.265-266) On the 
Friday before Thanksgiving, 1993, Henry Sigg was in Moab for his 
business and wanted to pick up the children the following day. When he 
could not get Carolyn Sigg on the telephone, he called every fifteen 
minutes leaving messages on the answering machine. As a result, Vic 
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Haynes reinstated the Complaint for telephone harassment charges with 
the Boulder Police. (Tr.95) 
50. Henry Sigg and Carolyn Sigg set up Christmas visitation 
by letter. Henry Sigg was requested to pick up the children in a 
downtown parking lot on December 20. When Henry Sigg arrived at the 
parking lot he was arrested by the Boulder Police for the telephone 
harassment charge and transported to jail where he posted bond. (Tr.53-
57) The arrest was made as a result of Vic Haynes supplying the 
information to the Boulder Police Department. (Tr.270-271) 
51. As a result, Henry Sigg obtained a lawyer and defended 
the telephone harassment charges which cost him One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) (D.Ex"2"), (Tr.57) and the matter was scheduled for trial in 
August 1994. 
52. On November 24, 1993, Henry Sigg filed a Verified 
Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree (Rec. 475-489) seeking, 
inter alia, termination of alimony, change in custody based upon 
interference with visitation, or alternatively, a set schedule of 
visitation, change in terms of health insurance payment, and attorneys 
fees. 
53. As a result of Henry Sigg's Motion, the Court entered a 
Temporary Order on February 15, 1994 granting specific visitation and 
appointing Elizabeth Stewart to perform a custody evaluation. (Rec. 
579-584) 
54. On June 9, 1994, Carolyne Sigg moved for a Continuance of 
Trial on the basis that Elizabeth Stewart had not yet filed her custody 
evaluation. (Rec. 633-634; Addendum, Ex.2) 
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55. On June 13, 1994, Elizabeth Stewart filed her custody 
evaluation (Rec: Sealed) which was admitted at trial over objections of 
Carolyne Sigg's counsel. 
56. The trial of this matter was held June 14 and 15, 1994, 
before the Honorable David S. Young. 
57. Carolyne Sigg's counsel moved to continue the trial based 
upon having received the custody evaluation the day prior to trial and 
an inability to prepare for the expert witness testimony. (Tr.3-4;78-
79). Judge Young denied the motion. 
58. At the commencement of the trial, Judge Young made the 
following comment: 
"I am curious about that last comment. If a parent 
has interfered with the right of another parent to 
maintain a relationship with the child, even though 
that parent may, in his or her own providing of 
care for the children, have a relatively good 
environment, isn't it in the childrens' best 
interest to place the children with the parent who 
would see that both parents have a healthy 
relationship with the child? (Tr.17)" 
59. At trial, Carolyne Sigg testified that Lindsay was five 
(5) years old and that Carolyne Sigg had cared for her, and Nicola, age 
nine (9) years, their entire lives. (Tr.279) 
60. Both Lindsay and Nicola are doing very well in school and 
are socially well adjusted. Carolyn Sigg has a flexible work schedule 
and is very involved in the regular school activities of both children. 
(Tr.281-84) 
61. Nicola is heavily involved in local sports in Boulder, 
Colorado, including baseball and gymnastics, and is involved in a 
cheerleading clinic. (Tr.284-85) 
62. Regarding the current condition of the children, Dr. 
Stewart testified: 
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"They're doing very well. They've always done well 
in school and they have been well taken care of. 
They are well clothed; well dressed. Mrs. Sigg 
takes particular attention to matters of being 
polite and tidy and careful in the home. 
The teachers of both children, before the divorce 
and since the divorce, have reported that Nicola 
has always been - that the parents, the home, Mrs. 
Sigg and Mr. Sigg, before, now Mrs. Sigg, has done 
a good job in following up on homework, the 
children, or child, Nicola, comes to school on time 
and there are no problems at all." (Tr.115-16) 
She further testified: 
"The children, all the children involved reported 
to be happy." (Tr.117) 
63. Judge Young recognizes that the children are "very very 
successful in their own individual mental attitudes, school experience 
and adjustments." (Judge's ruling, June 15, 1994, para. 11; Addendum, 
Ex.5) 
64. Dr. Stewart submitted her custody evaluation (Record: 
Sealed) and at trial recommended that it would be in the best interests 
of the children to change custody from Carolyn Sigg to Henry Sigg based 
upon Carolyn Sigg's alleged interference with visitation rights of Henry 
Sigg. (Tr.114) 
65. Dr. Stewart submitted her custody eva^ation (Record: 
Sealed) and in testimony recommended change of custody of the parties 
two (2) minor children primarily based upon what she considered 
interference with visitation rights despite recognition of the children 
being healthy, happy and doing very well in all respects of their lives 
while Carolyn Sigg has been the custodial parent for the prior four (4) 
years and the primary caretaker for their entire lives. (Tr.114) 
66. Prominently, Dr. Stewart attempts to create a new legal 
standard for custodial parents requiring that a custodial parent must 
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provide more visitation than is required by the Decree of Divorce and 
bear the entire burden of making visitation work otherwise, custody 
should be changed. 
a. Elizabeth Stewart recognizes that there has never 
been a period of time during which Henry Sigg has not receive^ the sixty 
(60) day visitation pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Divorce Decree. 
(Tr.124-125) 
b. Elizabeth Stewart recognizes that her entire 
recommendation is based upon alleged "interference with custody" for a 
total of two (2) five (5) month periods out of the forty-eight (48) 
months when Carolyn Sigg has been the custodial parent. (Tr.125-126) 
c. Despite Henry Sigg being foul and abusive and overly 
aggressive in conversations with Carolyne Sigg, it is Elizabeth 
Stewart's position that his behavior makes no difference to the 
communication/visitation issues and that Carolyn Sigg, being the 
custodial parent, has the burden to be reasonable and make 
communication/visitation work. (Tr.123) 
67. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Judge Young 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Rec. 671-690; 
Addendum, Ex.3) The Court entered Findings of Fact with respect to the 
following issues: 
a. Alimony. The Court found that Carolyne Sigg and Vic 
Haynes began cohabitating in February, 1993, terminated alimony and 
awarded Henry Sigg a $1,000 credit for overpayment. 
b. Day Care Expenses. Carolyne Sigg testified that day 
care expenses for Lindsay and Nicola Sigg for 1993 and through April 22, 
1994 were a total of Four Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Seven Dollars 
($4,277.00). In awarding the day care expenses the Court stated "Now I 
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have no great basis to determine upon which, how much of this should or 
should not be allowed, and so I am going to make a decision that one-
third (1/3) of the amount is the mother's costs solely and the parties 
are to divide the remainder." (Judge's ruling, June 15, 1994, P.7) 
(Rec.677) 
c. Attorneys Fees. According to Finding of Fact 20, 
"Defendant has been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position to 
assert his parental rights of visitations due to Plaintiff's actions, 
which actions are without excuse or justification" and further "that 
Plaintiff's conduct. . .was so extreme in nature that it is appropriate 
and equitable to require Plaintiff to bear some of Defendant's 
attorneys' fees and costs relative to his Petition to Modify." The 
Court awarded attorneys fees and related expenses as follows: 
(i) Campbell, Maack & Sessions - Nine Thousand 
Three Hundred Two Dollars and Forty Eight Cents ($9,302.48), which was 
supplemented by an additional Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in 
attorneys fees for a total of Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred Two 
Dollars and Forty Eight Cents ($14,302.48). (Rec.748); 
(ii) Regarding Henry Sigg's costs and expenses with 
his travel to Boulder, Colorado on December 20, 1993, the amount of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) and a vehicle impoundment charge of 
Sixty Dollars ($60.00) and attorneys fees charged by Michael Enwall in 
relation to representation in the criminal proceeding at the behest and 
instant of Victor Haynes in the amount of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00); and 
(iii) Expenses of Elizabeth Stewart, Ph.D., for Two 
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) for evaluation plus testimony at trial in 
the amount of Seven Hundred Dollars ($700.00) plus Three Hundred Thirty 
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Three Dollars and Thirty Four Cents ($333.34) for review of documents. 
(Rec.678-79) 
The only evidence of financial status of either party in the 
record is found in the Child Support Worksheet showing Henry Sigg 
grosses $4,333 per month and Carolyne Sigg grosses $2,800 per month. 
d. Custody/Visitation. While there are twenty four 
(24) separate Findings of Fact on the issue, the Court's position is 
best illustrated by paragraphs 42 and 47 which respectively state: 
42. That the children are closely bonded with each 
of their parents with the exception that tension 
has been created by Plaintiff because of her 
limiting or controlling the children's (sic) 
contact with Defendant and further that the 
Defendant has made considerable sacrifices to be 
close to his children and was even willing to sell 
his business and move to their domicile, if 
necessary, in order to be with his children. 
47. That although Plaintiff has been an attentive 
mother who was not neglecting the minor children, 
and the minor children were generally doing well in 
her custody, it is in the best interests of the 
parties' minor children that custody be changed 
from Plaintiff to Defendant for the principal 
reason, among others, that Defendant will 
facilitate visitation between Plaintiff and the 
minor children whereas Plaintiff has a history of 
interfering with Defendant's visitation with the 
minor children." (Rec.683-84) 
The only Finding of Fact regarding the issue of stability of 
the existing custodial relationship is made by incorporation of Dr. 
Stewart's findings. Paragraph 4 of Dr. Stewart's findings states: 
"The general interest and continuing previously 
determined custody arrangement where the children 
are happy and well adjusted. The children are not 
happy with the angry disputes between the parents 
and specifically they are not happy with the 
restrictions on visitation with their father that 
have been imposed upon them. Lindsay and to a 
lesser extent Nicola is not happy with Mr. Haynes 
being in their household during the past fifteen 
months. His presence and the problems with 
visiting their father and stepmother have become of 
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increasing concern to the children and give them 
sad feelings. The custody arrangements seemed to 
work well during the first fifteen months after 
divorce, but has deteriorated steadily since Mrs. 
Sigg departed with the children to New Zealand and 
has failed to facilitate visitation with the 
children except on her terms which are not in their 
best interests." 
The stability issue was simply slanted by Elizabeth 
Stewart into an issue relating to visitation and her idea of 
interference with visitation rights, and there is no indication of the 
weight accorded the stability factor by the Court. 
68. Based upon the Findings of Fact, the Court entered its 
related Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff and Victor Haynes entered 
into a cohabitation arrangement as of the end of 
February, 1993, and as such, no alimony is due or 
payable by Defendant to Plaintiff after the end of 
February, 1993. 
5. That one-third of the day care expenses incurred 
by the Plaintiff of $1,425.00 are her sole 
responsibility and that the balance of $2,852.00 
shall be assumed and paid by the parties equally. 
6. That Plaintiff shall assume and pay the fees 
and costs and expenses incurred by the Defendant to 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions in the amount of 
$9,302.48 through May 31, 1994, and such additional 
amounts as the Court may subsequently determine by 
affidavit submitted by Defendant's counsel. 
7. That Plaintiff shall assume, pay and discharge 
the costs and expenses of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart in 
the total sum of $3,033.34 by reimbursing Defendant 
the amount of $2,683.34. Plaintiff has already 
paid Dr. Stewart the amount of $350.00. 
8. That Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant for 
costs incurred relative to the Boulder visitation 
on December 20, 1993, in the amount of $310.00, and 
further that Plaintiff shall pay Defendant's 
attorney's fees and costs in the defense of the 
criminal action initiated at the behest and 
insistence of Victor Haynes in the amount of 
$1,000.00. 
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12. That there has been a significant change of 
circumstances with respect to the custody and 
visitation as previously ordered by the Court. 
13. That there has been a flagrant disregard of 
the rights of Defendant by Plaintiff and no desire 
to be flexible, cooperative or supportive. 
14. That the custody of the parties7 minor 
children shall be changed from Plaintiff to 
Defendant as of July 1, 1994 and Plaintiff shall be 
awarded reasonable visitation rights with the 
parties' minor children to include at least a 
minimum the standard statutory visitation 
schedule." 
69. On September 29, 1994, the Court entered the Amended 
Decree of Divorce. (Rec.693-700; Addendum, Ex.4) (Judge's Ruling, June 
15, 1994; Addendum Ex.5) 
70. Prior to the June 14-15, 1994 trial, there was one 
Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree filed by Henry Sigg 
which resulted in a Stipulated Withdrawal of Petition. (Rec.471) The 
Petition filed in New Zealand resulted in a determination that Carolyne 
Sigg had complied with the Court's visitation Order. Henry Sigg has 
received all visitation required by the Decree of Divorce from the date 
of entry of the Decree, April 17, 1991 to the date of trial, June 14-15, 
1994, and Carolyne Sigg has never been held in contempt for failure to 
provide visitation. Despite his superior earning ability and professed 
concern for his children, Henry Sigg only sporadically paid child 
support, as of January, 1994, Henry Sigg had failed to pay child support 
since May, 1993. (Tr.289) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
A. WHERE THE FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING "CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES" AND "BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN" DO NOT INCLUDE 
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE THAT HENRY SIGG RECEIVED ALL VISITATION ORDERED BY 
THE DIVORCE DECREE, THAT ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION WAS 
CONFINED TO TEN (10) OF FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS OF CUSTODY, THAT HENRY 
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SIGG'S ABUSIVE ACTIONS AND LANGUAGE PREVENTED FACILITATING VISITATION 
AND CONTAIN NO APPROPRIATE FINDING REGARDING STABILITY OF EXISTING 
CUSTODY RELATIONSHIP AND WEIGHT GIVEN STABILITY FACTOR BY THE COURT THAT 
THE FINDINGS ARE FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
B. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT A 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED BASED UPON INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION 
WHERE THE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE IS NOT MATERIAL TO PARENTING SKILLS AND 
FUNCTIONING OF THE CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP AND WHERE INTERFERENCE WITH 
VISITATION IS THE PRIMARY AND OVERRIDING FACTOR CONSIDERED BY THE COURT. 
THE OTHER FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURT WERE REASONABLY FORESEEABLE AT 
THE TIME OF THE DECREE OR INSUBSTANTIAL. 
C. WHERE CAROLYNE SIGG HAS SHOWN GOOD PARENTING SKILLS AS A 
PRIMARY CARETAKER OF HER DAUGHTER NICOLA AND LINDSAY FOR FIVE AND NINE 
YEARS RESPECTIVELY AND DURING FOUR YEARS OF CUSTODY, BOTH CHILDREN ARE 
PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY HEALTHY, AND HAPPY AND WELL-ADJUSTED, THE COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS TO 
TRANSFER CUSTODY TO HENRY SIGG BASED UPON SHORT TERM DISPUTED 
INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION. 
II. 
A. WHERE HENRY SIGG RECEIVED ALL VISITATION ORDERED BY THE 
DECREE, THERE IS NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR AWARDING HENRY SIGG ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND THERE IS NO COMMON LAW BASIS FOR AWARDING HENRY SIGG ATTORNEY'S 
FEES IN ABSENCE OF SHOWING NEED AND ABILITY TO PAY, IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION. 
B. THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW BASIS FOR AWARDING 
HENRY SIGG ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CONNECTION WITH HIS DEFENDING TELEPHONE 
HARASSMENT CHARGES IN THE STATE OF COLORADO. 
C. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING CAROLYN SIGG 
TO PAY ALL OF THE CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATOR'S FEES IN THE ABSENCE OF 
SHOWING HENRY SIGG'S NEED OR CAROLYNE SIGG'S ABILITY TO PAY. 
III. 
WHERE THE COURT ADMITTED THAT IT HAS NO BASIS FOR MAKING THE 
DETERMINE, THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION REQUIRING CAROLYNE SIGG TO BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE DAY CARE COSTS AND REQUIRING THE 
BALANCE TO BE EQUALLY SPLIT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
IV. 
A. THE FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING "CO-HABITATION" MISSTATE 
AND MISCHARACTERIZED THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AS NOT 
REFLECTING THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE OR BEING CLEARLY MISTAKEN. 
B. WHERE VIC HAYNES MAINTAINED HIS OWN CONDOMINIUM CONTAINING 
HIS FURNITURE, CLOTHING AND PERSONAL EFFECTS, AND VIC HAYNES DID NOT 
CONTRIBUTE OR SHARE ANY ONGOING EXPENSES OF UTILITIES, MORTGAGE, OR 
HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES, AND CAROLYNE SIGG AND VIC HAYNES SHARED NO ASSETS, 
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THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY TERMINATING ALIMONY EFFECTIVE 
FEBRUARY, 1993. 
JUDGE YOUNG'S FAILURE TO GRANT CAROLINE SIGG'S MOTION TO 
CONTINUE THE TRIAL BASED UPON THE CUSTODY EVALUATION HAVING BEEN FILED 
ONE DAY PRIOR TO TRIAL WAS CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL IN THAT CAROLYNE SIGG HAD 
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This Brief shall show that the Court's action was a clear 
abuse of discretion, inconsistent with Utah case law and not supported 
by the facts. 
I. 
CHANGE OF CUSTODY BASED UPON "INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION" 
IS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. Utah Law On Decree Modification Re; Custody. 
Utah has adopted a bifurcated procedure which a trial court is 
required to follow when considering a Petition for Modification of a 
custody award. In Hoqqe v. Hoqqe, 649 P.2d (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
"In the initial step, the Court will receive 
evidence only as to the nature and materiality of 
any changes in those circumstances upon which the 
earlier award of custody was based. In this step, 
the party seeking modification must demonstrate (1) 
that since the time of the previous decree, there 
have been changes in circumstances upon which the 
previous award was based; and (2) that those 
changes are sufficiently substantial and material 
to justify reopening the question of custody. 
In the second step . . . the trial court must 
consider the changes in circumstances along with 
all other evidence relevant to the welfare or best 
interests of the child including the advantage of 
stability in custody arrangements that will 
always weigh against 
changes in the party awarded custody." Hoqqe v. 
Hoqqe at p. 54. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated the necessity and 
explained the meaning of the threshold requirement of the bifurcated 
procedure establishing unequivocal guidelines for trial courts to follow 
in custody modification petitions. In Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 
610 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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"In order to meet this threshold requirement, a 
party must show, in addition to the existence and 
extent of change, that the change is significant in 
relation to the modification sought. The asserted 
change mustf therefore, have some material 
relationship to and substantial affect on parenting 
ability or the functioning of the presently 
existing custodial relationship. In the absence of 
an indication that the change has or will have such 
affect, the materiality requirement is not met. 
Accordingly, it is not sufficient merely to allege 
a change which, although otherwise substantial, 
does not essentially effect the custodial 
relationship. 
The r e q u i i e d s h o w i n g in, a t e r i a 1 i t y i s t o be 
distinguished from the evidence that is 
appropriately presented in the second phase of the 
proceeding which the "best interest" analysis 
occurs. The materiality requirement is designed to 
help the court decide if there is a valid reason to 
reopen the question already settled by an earlier 
order, while the best interests analysis relates to 
a present and future readjustment of the parties' 
interest. In other words, if the circumstances 
that have changed do not appear on their face to be 
the kind of circumstances on which an earlier 
custody decision was based, there i s no valid 
reason to reconsider that decision. The rational 
is that custody placements, once made, should be as 
stable as possible unless the factual basis for 
them has completely changed." 
On facts wh i ch are strikingly similar to the case now before 
the Court, this Coin: t has reversed a trial court modification of a 
Decree of I)i ^  rorce trai isf erring custod} 11 i Cummings v. Cummi nqs , 82 1 
P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991), the parties wer e di voiced i n 1980, at which 
time they had one son. Subsequently, they engaged in pei iods of 
reconciliation wh i ch i: esul ted i n the bir th of a second son In 198(J . The 
par t:i e: 3 p« n riiai lei i1 .3 \ separated :ii i l ] 986 Tl n sy sti pill a 1 ed t ha 1 Mi i, , 
Cummings should have custody of the parties"'" two mi nor children. In 
1989 Mr Cummings petitioned for a niodif I cation of the Decree of 
D •- - ; e s e e k i n g j: > e r in a n e n t c u s t o d y of the c h i ] d r e n. At t r i a 1, M r . 
Cummings presented evidence from Dr. Elizabeth Stewart who, after 
25 
evaluating the parties and their children, testified that in her 
opinion, Mr. Cummings should have custody. Dr. Stewart's written 
evaluation of each person was also admitted into evidence and 
incorporated into the court's findings. Additionally, the parties 11 
year old child testified that he preferred to live with his father but 
wished to spend as much time as possible with his mother. After a three 
day trial, the Court found a substantial change in circumstances had 
occurred and it was in the best interests of the children that custody 
be transferred to Mr. Cummings. The Court based its determination of a 
change of circumstances upon the following findings: that Ms. Scott had 
separate relationships with three different men over the prior three 
years; that Mr. Scott (Ms. Cummings'' remarried spouse) imposed rules and 
discipline on the children which caused them emotional harm; that Mrs. 
Cummings interfered with Mr. Cummings' visitation rights; and that 
custody had never been litigated but had been resolved originally 
through stipulation. The court also found that Mrs. Cummings held three 
different jobs during the past three years and had been in her current 
position for less than one year. Mrs. Cummings appealed the trial 
court's change of custody. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the facts upon which the trial 
court based its assessment that a change in circumstances had occurred. 
The Court first indicated that although Mrs. Cummings had held three 
different jobs in the last three years, it pointed out the trial court 
did not state how it adversely affects the children or is relevant to 
Mrs. Cummings' parenting ability. Then, the Court reviewed Mrs. 
Cummings' interference with Mr. Cummings' visitation rights stating, 
"Again, there is no explanation of how these disputes over visitation 
impact the parenting ability of Ms. Scott (Mrs. Cummings). All 
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.i terent problem, associated with the 
current custody dispute." The trial Cuuil then reviewed IU" Stewart M 
testimony findinq that the boys iiad suffered emotional, harms due to the 
.11 s^ "t\ ] i ne in posed by Mi t" - ummings -•: * ent husband. The 
Court stated, '"I'neie i s no evidence m ] I. 01; psychologica] 
abuse. In fad , Lin record estabii^ne^ t - . only method ol, 
disci pi inlru] the children that Mi, Sco: : .--.; sending the children 
to tl lei i: inuiiih 11 in 1 in i i 'vu k i in | llieii fi . " ine Court concluded 
that there was no evidence of emotional harm, tonally, the Court noted: 
"The Court (trial coui t ) did not make factual 
findings regarding the circumstances at either of 
the two times that the parties stipulated to the 
custody arrangement. There is undisputed evidence, 
however, that the circumstances now are much the 
same as at the time of the second stipulation. 
There is no evidence or findings to suggest that 
Ms. Scott (Mrs. Cummings) is substantially less 
able now to care of the boys and provide them a 
stable and loving home than she was when Mr. 
Cummings agreed that Ms. Scott (Mrs. Cummings) 
should have custody." Cummings v. Cummings at 
p. 477, 
In a holding which squarely applies to the facts now before 
this Court, the Cummings' court stated: 
"In this case, most of the factors contributing to 
the change in circumstances cited in the Court's 
findings were foreseeable at both the time of the 
Decree and the subsequent orders. . . . 
We find that even under the Elmer evidentiary 
standard, the changes are not sufficient to 
constitute a substantial or materi al change of 
circumstances." Cummings at 478. 
Concluding the portion of the opinion on custody, the Court 
made it clear that changes in custody after a long standing custodial 
relai u Jin-dii |, i die stionglx dis£a\ 'ored especially i i: i i icjhr < A T he 
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petitioner's failure to show a change of circumstance. The Court 
stated: 
"If this were an initial custody determination, we 
would be much less likely to disturb the trial 
court's ruling because of the deference we accord 
the trial court to weigh the relative merits of the 
two homes, one with differing but not harmful 
parenting styles. However, where, as here, the 
trial court reversed a long standing arrangement, 
without appropriate consideration of the years 
these boys had lived with their mother, we cannot 
affirm. We reverse the custody award, rather than 
remanding for further proceedings, to minimize 
further disruption of the children's or parties' 
lives." Cumminqs at 479-80. 
In the event the Court determines that there has been a 
substantial and material change in circumstances, it may then consider 
the "best interests of the child." In Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 
(Utah App.1990) the Utah Court of Appeals enumerated specific factors 
which must be included in determination of the best interests of a child 
in a custody dispute. Those factors include: 
"The need for stability in custodial relationships 
and environment; maintaining an existing primary 
custodial bond; the relative strength of parental 
bonds; the relative abilities of the parents to 
provide care, supervision and a suitable 
environment for the children and to meet the needs 
of the children; preference of a child able to 
evaluate the custody question; the benefits of 
keeping siblings together, enabling siblings bonds 
to form; the character and emotional stability of 
the custodian; and the desire for custody, the 
apparent commitment of the proposed custodian to 
parent. Moon v. Moon at 54. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, 
"If an existing custody arrangement is not inimical 
to the child, the continuity and stability of the 
arrangement are factors to be weighed in 
determining a child's best interests. What 
particular way to be accorded those factors in a 
given case must depend upon the duration of the 
initial custody arrangement, the age of the child, 
the nature of the relationship that has developed 
between the child and the custodial and non-
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cub^odxa^ puitii.1™, and how we] 1 the child Is 
thriving physically, mentally and emotionally." 
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 604 (Utah 1989) 
The Elmer court further emphas.:;-; hat "* 1enathv c;. -
arrangement in which a child has thrived ouq\~ ^:e.2. : -~* .* . , -
di stur bed, and t .1 ic n I oi .] y i f 1 h«' r i rrumstanees are 
compelling"." Elmer v. Elmer a I <»(J4 . The lit ,ih l upreme C o m I h.i, Juiilu. f 
•
fv Lr-;; ":»: considering competing claims to custody between fit parents 
• * sts of the child' standard, considerable weight 
should be given to which parent has been the cl . • s pi: i iriary car e gi vei : 
prior to the divorce, Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d * 47, 648 (Utah 1988). 
B. The Findings of Fact regarding Visitation/Custody are not 
supported by the record and a clear mistake has been made. 
The Findings of Fact regarding Visitation/Custody (Tr.27-51; 
Rec. 679-685) are not supported by the record regarding interference 
with visitation iiml, iiildit mihjlly, lail In ,tdr - - ni factors 
which are requiied in change oi custody cases. 
Interference with Visitation findings are contrary to the 
f o 1 ] o "w :i n g i 11 i r e b u t t: e d e v :i d e n c e : 
] , Henry Sigg Always Received Visitation Ordered, by the 
Court. Henry Si gg always received the sixty (60) days visitation 
outlined in paragraph 2 of the Deer ee of Divorce both while Carolyne 
Sigg was i „ lie: Zea ] and and i n the I In i t .ed St .a f es , ( Tr. 44 ; 183; 259) 
There was no violation of visitatioi i by Car olyne Siqg at any point. 
R h e t ^ : ; e a _ , * •„ . HF .*- be-^n*-:- \ * • ,*t legitimately change 
ci is' - • n visitdLxun when Henry Sigg has 
received - * ..i - ^ :._.:. w:t :. has been ordered by the Court. 
Consistent Verbal Abuse and Harassment, The unrebutted 
evidence is that Henry sigg has consistently and relentlessly pursued a 
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course of verbal abuse of Carolyne Sigg since the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. The Court and the evaluator make much of the Divorce Decree's 
requirement to "openly and freely communicate regarding the children." 
However, Henry Sigg's foul and abusive telephone calls both to the 
children and to Carolyne Sigg, his several threats and foul name calling 
in respect to Carolyne Sigg are not addressed as totally preventing any 
"open and free communication". After listening to telephone messages 
and conversations with Henry Sigg, the Boulder City Police filed a 
telephone harassment charge against Henry Sigg and issued a warrant for 
his arrest. The evaluator, with whom the Court agrees, does not believe 
that this type of aggressive verbal behavior when attempting to deal 
with visitation is "not detrimental". (Tr.123) 
3. Length of Time of Alleged Interference. The unrebutted 
evidence shows that the facts presented in support of Carolyne Sigg's 
alleged interference with visitation span a total of ten (10) months out 
of a total of forty eight (48) months of being the custodial parent. 
(Tr.126;257-59) The initial alleged interference occurred during the 
five (5) month period from when Carolyne Sigg left Utah in late August, 
1992 for Colorado and New Zealand and returned to Colorado in February, 
1993. The evidence regarding "interference" was vehemently disputed by 
Carolyne Sigg and the New Zealand Court determined that no violation of 
the Utah Decree occurred. (Tr.44;183) The second period, after Henry 
Sigg returned the children five (5) days late on August 28, 1993 through 
January, 1994. The abbreviated period of alleged interference is 
clearly contrary to a substantial and material change in circumstances 
or a change in custody when balanced against the lengthy custodial 
relationship of Carolyne Sigg with the children of four (4) years and 
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that of being the primary caretaker of five (5) years for Lindsay and 
nine (9 ) y e a i: s f : r N i c o 2 a 
4 No Required Finding on Stability and Weight Accorded nv 
Trial Court, There is no Finding of fact which shows an examination of 
Hip ? I »il)i [ i L> rj-ed! ^i.'l |;iy the foui i 4 i \ i--vj i custodial relat ionship 
between Carolyne- Sigg and Nicola and Lint-ibr-iy innJ I i"n.j w< icjlit ncrinidt il U) 
the Court to the relationship. While Elizabeth Stewart's Finding ioui, 
recited above, relates to stability, it provides nothing more than a 
slanted v lew o f v i s i L. 11 J on i s s 11es 
6. Errors in Findings of Fact in the following respect; 
a. Finding of Fact 4 3 is clearly erroneous in that 
gei'j for visitation foi Henry Siqq upon her return 
from New Zealand as follows; March 19-28; Apiil lb-20; May 2b-June A, 
{Tr.92;295-97| , Additionally, Henry Sigg was accorded his lengthy 
TP e r t i. in e v i s i t. a I" i o n i;. h r o u g h Angus t 2 8, 199 3 , {T r .9 3 ) D u r i n q t h e 
spring and summer oi J 993, Henry Sigg had free and open Ltjlephune 
communication with his daughters* (Tr.255-56) 
b. I inding of Fact 4 7 is clearly erroneous regarding ,-„ 
"history of interference" based upon the un.r ebuLt.ed Li" ts SLJ 
'l1 Bias of Evaluator, While the Court has the discrete :. :•.. 
weigh the credibility of the expert witness, i t unfortunately : ;v; : :.: J 
the e\ raluato: : s i n ifoui ided character attack ai id lead I! risserti . wnne 
the evaluator ignores, and sometimes justifi es, outrageous behavior by 
Henry Sigg, she is qui ck to magnify insignificant minor issues r elati ng 
to Carolyne Sigg. For example, as a resul t of Carolyne Sigg suggesting 
to Henry Sigg in a flippant inai n lei: 1:1: la I: Vi c Hayi les shoul ci adopt the 
children after Henry Si gg suggested that Vic Haynes pay child support, 
she viewed Carolyne as being totally insensitive and irrational 
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(Tr.105); that Henry Sigg's name calling and abusive language while 
dealing with visitation was not detrimental to arranging visitation 
(Tr.123); that despite the fact Henry Sigg consistently brought the 
children back late, up to five (5) days, from his visitation, it is 
"unreasonable to expect him to change" (Tr.144); discounts the fact that 
Henry Sigg's stepmother adamantly believes that Henry Sigg should not be 
the custodial parent (Tr.157-58); excuses Henry Sigg's hitting his five 
(5) year old daughter (Tr.158); places the entire burden of setting up 
and maintaining visitation on Carolyne Sigg. (Tr.110-112;123-25) 
Additionally, Elizabeth Stewart sets up a new legal standard 
to be followed by custodial parents i.e. that despite having followed 
the Court's Order in providing an appropriate length of visitation, 
unless a custodial parent provides more than is required by the Court 
Order, the custodial parent should lose custody to a more facilitating 
ex-spouse. (Tr.110-112;123-25) 
C. The Findings of Fact fail to demonstrate a 
"Substantial and Material change of circumstances". 
The record and the Findings of Fact fail to show that there has been a 
substantial and material change of circumstances from the time of entry 
of the Decree of Divorce to the time of trial, June 14-15, 1994. 
In Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that interference with visitation "may be a factor 
relevant to the issues of both a change in circumstance and the child's 
best interests". Smith v. Smith at 411. However, that statement was 
made in light of the facts of the case, i.e. the trial court holding 
Mrs. Smith in contempt on two occasions for denying visitation rights 
continuously over an eight (8) year period. 
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In the case now before * n< 
does not rise In line J eve! 
become "a factor" in a change : 
: , ,
 T
 a. . e„:eo ^/'^erference 
- reieiice win ~h could 
jt it-.ru m a t ion as sa died in 
Smith v. Smith, supra, C~: „ ivue SICK; !,a^ allegedly intertered wi th 
Henry Sigg'a vial tat i < >ri . .nore iiidii Leu y±^ months 
out of 'forty eight ( 4 ti) months, Henr, -c < : - ^ ^ I V R H the si.Ly (60) 
days visitation each year acrrrde,* ..i *v Decree * L_v:*;:- and tlie 
facts regarding Interference nave Deen adamant , \- nis- * 4 r - .laroiyne 
Sigg. All of the evidence presented was 'stimonv 
arid the Court took Henry Sigg'.-- ?.::-. had.ii na,, :u temporary or 
> /- i - r-
,- : a-' xn addressed 
tneii 
I K H in n o 
primary 
and the 
i s un 
. a:_' 
permanent move to New Zealanr 
in the Divorce Degree and thi 
violation of the Utah Decree L* December , .•<•: 
P Is undisputed that -: 
c d r e t a k e i: » I M i i < > I a i i  r i»;, I I.. :i r 
custodial parent, toi the past :.^: • .*-'--
children are healthy, happy, well adjustec, \i 
iiiothet wlni p.iy, attention n. * •- s ^ o- , 
physical arid mental health ant1 
doinq very well in hei care, ' JIT •. : , i>^  
and their current well being, it was virtually i emarkable that a finding 
o i.umijiH i JI ci t ouriiut ,;nicc " , i« n I i v Lit ed \ u i 'nrolyne Sigg ' s parenting 
ability or her functioning as a custodial parent, occurred. 'The Court 
erroneously allowed the alleged Interference to become the controlling 
f a d ui ami no! *",i fairioii"1 determining whether a change of 
circumstances had occurred. h^viewing the Court's Findings of Fact, 
there are no other factors whicr; were not foreseeable by the parties at 
the ti in • .f 1 .1 i€ i divorce or j3ey0ncj reasonable expectations. 
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* . . J l d I I l i t 
y :e S i g g s a g o o d 
• : . v i t i e s , 
l l 111 ' i n ' I • 
, .
 r
, , \ ,IK ^ .- m o t h e i 
Additionally, the most that can be said about the interference issue in 
the Findings of Fact is that the arguing on the telephone between Henry 
and Carolyne Sigg and discussions regarding visitation created "tension" 
in the home which seem quite reasonable in light of Henry Sigg's foul 
and abusive telephone calls. (Finding of Fact 42) 
As in Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, there has been no substantial and 
material change of circumstances warranting consideration of the "best 
interests of the children" or, alternatively, warranting a finding of 
change of custody. The modification of the Decree regarding change in 
custody should be reversed based on there having been no substantial and 
material change in circumstances. 
D. The Court's determining that it is in the "best interests 
of the children" to transfer custody is clear error. 
The trial court failed to properly evaluate the factors set 
forth in Moon v. Moon 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990) when making the 
change in custody. 
The overriding factor of maintaining a custodial relationship 
which had been in place for four (4) years and a primary caretaking 
relationship which had been in place five (5) and nine (9) years, and 
which produced healthy, happy, and stable children was given very short 
shrift. In that light, it is difficult to see how the bonding to Henry 
Sigg could be anywhere near as significant as the bonding to Carolyne 
Sigg, but the Court so found by incorporating Dr. Stewart's finding. 
Each of the parents had equal ability to provide care and supervision 
since both were working families and preference for a stated parent 
should have been given little consideration due to the children's ages. 
The character and emotional stability were not clearly considered. No 
mention was made of Henry Sigg's admitted aggressive behavior, corporal 
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pin lishment of the children, 1 oss c f temper and inabi 1 ity : > 
a p p r o p r i a t e ! ^ expr e s s ii l g e r . Tl le t r i a ] cou r t:' s f i i id i i lg 1:1 l a t i t is in 
the "best interests of the children"' to change custody primar il y based 
upon the kind of "interference" al leged is contrary to the fundamental 
pi: i nci pa] s ai id o v e n :i de :i i I concern expressed by this Court of 
maintaining stabi1ity of a custodia 1 re1ati ons 1 I p, based upon Carc >J y i Ie 
Sigg's positive arid appropriate parenting foi a signiticant period oi 
1
 J mfi• Cummings v. C u m m i n q s , supra; Paryzek v. Paryzek f 7 7 6 P . 2 d 7 8 [Ui rili 
A p p . 1.989); Tucker v. Tucker,, 081 I\ hi lMH |UI ih M|"ll". I'J'U). 
1 1 . 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPERTS FEES IS CONTRARY 
TO UTAH JaAW MtLllUNlILLVE.2. 
Judge You1" i awarding Henry Sigg over Fourteen Thousand Dollars 
($14,000,00) in attorneys fees in connection with the Petition for 
Mod i f i cat i oi i Oi I a Thoi l s and Do3 1 a r s • ( $ ] , 0 ()!),(i f) | 111 a f 111 r n e y s f e e s p 1 us 
associated fees i ncur red by Henry Si gg i n tie tending the i-olorado 
criminal charge, and oven: Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000,00) in experts 
£ees re] ati ng I:c I: I: Ie ser v i ces of E] :i zabeth Stewart is without statutory 
or common law basis ai id :i s excessi ve and punitive in naline, The cludi 
message is that Judge Young intends to punish Carolyne Sigg through 
monetary measures as we] I as depri ving Carolyne of her children. The 
a w a r d o f f e e s t } ] u d g e Y o u i I g :i s irt a d e :i i :i I i 11111 of II HM mil y f I. n a n c i a i 
information regarding both parties i n the record indicating t • - Henrv 
Sigg'b monthly income is Four 'Ihousana Three Hundred Thir*. \ ;hree 
Dol±axs ( $4 , 13 T . (J 11 i j rid Carolyne Siqq's monthly income is Two Thousand 
Eight Hundred imllair 1 \J
 ( (' DH , Uin "hi hi S u p u o i t W m k h l i e e l , h 
Findings ol Fact 53
 r Weu.thj) The landings oi I act regarding "attorneis 
fees" do not support the various awards of fees. (Rec.678-679) 
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A. The award of attorneys fees on the Petition for 
Modification is without statutory or common law basis. Attorneys fees 
in the State of Utah may only be awarded according to a specific 
statutory ground or common law principals. Judge Young abused his 
discretion in awarding fees to Henry Sigg in that there is no statutory 
or common law basis under which the award of fees could be made. The 
only basis upon which the fees could be awarded are: 
1. Section 30-3-5(7) U.C.A. Section 30-3-5(7) Utah 
Code Annotated states: 
"If a Petition for Modification of child custody or 
visitation provision of a Court Order is made and 
denied, the Court shall order the Petitioner to pay 
reasonable fees expended by the prevailing party in 
that action, if the Court determines that the 
Petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith." 
Section 30-3-5(7) Utah Code Ann, is inapplicable to the 
fees awarded by the Court in that Henry Sigg did not assert, nor did the 
Court find, that "the Petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith." Additionally, the Petition for 
Modification was granted. 
2. Section 30-3-5(8) Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(8) 
Utah Code Ann, states: 
"If a Petition alleges substantial noncompliance 
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent 
or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has 
been previously granted by the Court, the Court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorneys fees and court costs, incurred by 
the prevailing party because of the other party's 
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation." 
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There has been no violation by Carolyne Sigg of the 
visitation rights granted to Henry Sigg under the Decree of Divorce. 
Paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce states: 
"The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the minor children of the 
parties. There shall be reserved in the Defendant 
reasonable rights of visitation which will be 
consistent with those rights of visitation which 
have been exercised by the Defendant during the 
pendency of these proceedings, every other weekend, 
every Tuesday and Thursday evening, and such other 
times as the parties may agree. In the event the 
Plaintiff should elect to reside in New Zealand or 
elsewhere outside of the state of Utah, the 
Defendant shall be entitled to exercise extended 
visitation for up to sixty (60) days each year, 
which visitation shall take into consideration the 
children's school schedules. If the Defendant does 
exercise extended visitation because of Plaintiff's 
move as herein set out, the Defendant is entitled 
to exercise visitation in two separate segments, at 
his option." 
Henry Sigg has always received the court ordered visitation 
under paragraph 2 of Decree since entry of the Decree of Divorce on 
April 7, 1991. When Henry Sigg commenced an action in New Zealand, the 
Court found that there had been no violation of the Utah Decree. 
(Tr.44;183) Carolyne Sigg returned to the state of Colorado in February, 
1992, and thereafter, Henry Sigg exercised visitation with Lindsay and 
Nicola consistent with paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce. There has 
simply been no violation of the visitation order. 
Additionally, there is no Finding of Fact that Carolyne Sigg 
has violated paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce which would support 
the Court's award. The Findings of Fact simply state that "Henry Sigg 
has been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position to assert his 
parental rights of visitation due to Plaintiff's actions." (Finding of 
Fact 20); that Henry Sigg has incurred attorneys fees and costs in 
enforcing the provisions of the Decree (Finding of Fact 21); and that 
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Plaintiff's conduct is extreme and it is appropriate and equitable to 
require Plaintiff to bear Defendant's attorneys' fees and costs relative 
to the Petition for Modification (Finding of Fact 22). 
There is no basis for the Court awarding fees under Section 
30-3-5(8) Utah Code Ann. 
3. Utah common law does not provide a basis for awarding 
fees. Under Utah common law, in connection with divorce litigation, an 
award of fees may be made only upon a showing of need and ability to 
pay. Kerr v. Kerr 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980); Osquthorpe v. Osquthorpe, 
804 P.2d 430 (Utah App. 1990). 
The record in this matter discloses that Henry Sigg earns 
significantly more money than Carolyne Sigg i.e. Henry's monthly income 
is Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Three Dollars ($4,333.00) as 
opposed to Carolyne's, which is Two Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars 
($2,800.00) per month. It is apparent that Henry Sigg does not have the 
need nor does Carolyne Sigg have the ability to pay the awarded fees. 
Despite the disparity in income, Judge Young awarded Henry Sigg these 
attorneys fees. It was an abuse of discretion to do so. 
B. The award of attorneys fees and related costs in the 
Colorado action is an abuse of discretion. Judge Young's award of 
attorneys fees in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), travel 
costs of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) and vehicle impoundment 
costs of Sixty Dollars ($60.00) in connection with Henry Sigg's arrest 
on charges of telephone harassment in Boulder, Colorado is a further 
indication of Judge Young's intent to punish Carolyne Sigg. There is 
no statutory or common law basis for the award. 
The record discloses that Vic Haynes, Carolyne Sigg's 
boyfriend, filed and pursued the telephone harassment charges against 
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Henry Sigg. (Tr.94-95; 314-315) The Boulder City, Colorado, authorities 
made an independent assessment finding probable cause to file the 
charges and pursued the matter after listening to the tape recordings of 
Henry Sigg's messages and language. Carolyne Sigg is not responsible 
for, nor does she have control over, the Boulder City municipality in 
bringing these charges or arresting Henry Sigg on December 20, 1993. 
The attorneys fees and related costs were simply not incurred by Henry 
Sigg on any legitimate basis which would allow Judge Young to award the 
fees. The award of fees is a clear abuse of discretion and should be 
reversed. 
C. Judge Young abused his discretion in awarding experts 
fees. The Order requiring Carolyne Sigg to pay the child custody 
evaluator's fee is without statutory or common law basis. 
Under Utah law, Judge Young could only award the evaluator's 
fee based upon need and ability to pay. In Peterson v. Peterson, 818 
P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991) Mr. Peterson appealed the Court's Order 
requiring him to pay charges for the custody evaluation, polygraph 
examination, expert witness fees, service fee and copying charges. The 
Court initially held that it was within the Court's sound discretion to 
define costs as those reasonable amounts that are reasonably expended to 
prosecute or defend a divorce action, and further held, "We also hold 
that Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3 empowers a Court to use its sound 
discretion in determining whether to award costs based on need and 
ability to pay." Peterson v. Peterson at 1310. In concluding the 
opinion, the Court further stated: 
"In light of the fact that the Court knew the 
financial situation of both parties and made a 
reason judgment based on that information, we 
conclude that the Court was within its sound 
discretion to award these costs to Ms. Peterson 
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based on her need and on Mr. Peterson's ability to 
pay." Pe rson v. Peterson at 1311. 
First, the record now before the Court shows that Henry Sigg 
has a significantly greater ability to pay Elizabeth Stewart's fees than 
does Carolyne Sigg. Second, the record is otherwise void of evidence 
regarding the financial conditions of the parties. As a result, Judge 
Young clearly abused his discretion in ordering Carolyne Sigg to pay 
Elizabeth Stewart's fees and costs. 
III. 
THE AWARD OF DAY CARE COSTS WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Judge Young's Order requiring Carolyne Sigg to be solely 
responsible for one-third (1/3) of the day care costs and the parties 
thereafter to be responsible for one half (h) of the day care costs is 
arbitrary and capricious and not based upon any evidence in the record. 
The sole evidence in the record regarding costs incurred by 
Carolyne Sigg for day care of Lindsay and Nicola during 1993 and 1994 is 
based upon Carolyne Sigg's testimony. (Tr.306-07) Carolyne Sigg 
testified that her job required that she work at home and that she was 
not able to effectively pursue her work, especially on the telephone, 
while her daughters were present. As a result, it was necessary for her 
to obtain day care, primarily for Lindsay, while she performed her job. 
None of Carolyne Sigg's testimony was rebutted. In relation to the day 
care costs, the Court found as follows: 
"The Court finds as to the day care costs that the 
day care costs were not all incurred as a 
legitimate cost of day care for the caring for the 
children while the mother was otherwise working, 
that many of the decisions in relation to the day 
care costs were really not necessary even though I 
recognize that she could not work as fully out of a 
home with the child present as she might be engaged 
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without the child being present. Now I have no 
great basis to determine on which, how much of this 
should or should not be allowed, and so I am going 
to make a decision that one third of the amount is 
to be the mother's cost solely and the parties are 
to divide the remainder." (Judge's Ruling, April 
15, 1995 at 6-7; Addendum, Ex.5) 
There is simply no evidence in the record or rational formula 
available which would allow Judge Young to require Carolyne Sigg to be 
solely responsible for one third (1/3) of the day care costs while 
awarding the balance to be paid equally. The Court abused its 
discretion in entering the award. The total costs for day care of Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Seven Dollars ($4,277.00) for the years 
1993 and 1994 should be equally split between the parties. 
IV. 
EARLY TERMINATION OF ALIMONY BASED UPON COHABITATION 
IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
Judge Young's ruling that payment of alimony by Henry Sigg to 
Carolyne Sigg should terminate as of February, 1993, is not supported by 
the record and is contrary to Utah law. 
A. The Findings of Fact on Cohabitation are contrary to the 
weight of evidence. 
Mr. Sigg has misrepresented and mischaracterized Carolyne 
Sigg's testimony on the issue of cohabitation, which is contained at 
pages 223-224 and 326 of the transcript of hearing. Henry Sigg repeated 
his daughter Nicola's statement regarding furniture at pages 212 - 216 
of the transcript. As a result of the confined nature of Carolyne 
Sigg's testimony on the issue, "marshalling the evidence" is the same as 
accurately stating the evidence from the record and correcting Mr. 
Sigg's very apparent misstatements contained in Findings of Fact 5, 6, 
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7, 9, 10 and 12 at pages 4 and 5 of the Findings. Carolyne Sigg's 
testimony is: 
Carolyne Sigg left Park City on August 20, 1992 and drove to 
Boulder, Colorado, where she stayed with Vic Haynes and the children for 
five (5) to six (6) days at his home at 3734 Cripple Creek Trail, prior 
to going to Disneyland and Auckland, New Zealand. (Tr.223-24) During 
this time she slept with him and had intercourse. (Tr.226) Prior to 
leaving Park City, Carolyne sold her furniture and placed small 
household items in storage, none of which were moved to Haynes house. 
(Tr.227) When Ms. Sigg returned from New Zealand in February 1992, she 
stayed with Vic Haynes at his home for two (2) weeks, where she and the 
girls ate, slept, and maintained their wearing apparel brought from 
Australia; only food expenses were shared; and Carolyne and Vic Haynes 
had intercourse. (Tr.229) At the end of two weeks, Carolyne and the 
children moved to a condominium two blocks away at the address of 3003 
Redstone Lane (Tr.229) which she leased for six months through the end 
of August 1993. (Tr.230) In August, she and Haynes purchased a home 
together. (Tr.230) Carolyne Sigg purchased all the furniture for her 
condominium; Haynes lent her a couch to use. (Tr.231) Haynes often 
shared meals with her. (Tr.231) Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes often saw each 
other; Mr. Haynes slept at her condominium from time to time and on 
those occasions they had intercourse. (Tr.232) Mr. Haynes never 
assisted Carolyne Sigg in expenses; however, occasionally he contributed 
expenses for food or brought in food. (Tr.232) Mr. Haynes from time to 
time parked his car at Carolyne Sigg's and had free access to the house 
and access to a key to the house, which was kept outside. (Tr.233) Mr. 
Haynes never maintained clothes at Carolyne's residence but he kept his 
clothes at his own residence two blocks away. (Tr.233-34) Mr. Haynes 
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did not conduct business out of her condominium. (Tr.234) Vic Haynes 
visited Carolyne Sigg and the girls in New Zealand during Christmas. 
(Tr.326) According to Henry Sigg, his daughter Nicola said "Nicky just 
had told me that because we were wondering if Carolyne and Vic are 
together, Nicky had told me that the TV and all the good stuff was in 
one apartment and that Vic basically, essentially slept with the 
childrens' mother every night." (Tr.213) 
When viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Sigg, key 
portions of Findings of Fact 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 are significantly 
inaccurate and contrary to the clear weight of evidence and should be 
set aside or replaced with the accurate immediately preceding Statement 
of Fact. 
B. Under Utah law, Carolyne Sigg did not "cohabitate". 
Either under the accurate Statement of Fact set forth above, 
or under the mischaracterized Statement of Facts regarding cohabitation, 
Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes did not "cohabitate" or "reside" together 
as the latter term is defined for purposes of terminating alimony. 
Section 30-3-5(6) Utah Code Ann. 
The Findings of Fact do not meet the threshold requirement 
established by the Utah Supreme Court that parties must maintain "common 
residency" in order to terminate alimony. In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 
669 (Utah 1985), the Court stated that there are two (2) key elements to 
determining cohabitation: common residency and sexual contact 
evidencing a conjugal association; "common residency" means "the sharing 
of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile 
for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Haddow v. Haddow at 
672. Reviewing the facts regarding common residency, the Court found 
that a Mr. Hudson spent a substantial amount of time at the appellant's 
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(Mrs. Haddow's) home but questioned the court's not finding that Mr. 
Hudson was at the appellant's home when she was not there or had a key. 
This was particularly significant in that they stated "a resident will 
come and go as he pleases in his own home, while a visitor, however 
regular and frequent, will schedule his visits to coincide with the 
presence of the person he is visiting." Haddow v. Haddow at 673. There 
was testimony that Mr. Hudson did not move any furniture into the home 
or keep any personal items there except, toiletry articles, and a few 
items of clothing that appellant had laundered or dry cleaned and one 
picture album. However the Court noted there was no significance to 
these personal effects. The Court also considered significant the issue 
of shared living expenses. They found it significant that the parties 
did not share any financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of 
the household or share any assets. In particular, Mr. Hudson did not 
contribute to mortgage payments, insurance or utility bills, but 
occasionally paid appellant for purchasing food. The Court held: 
"It is therefore our opinion that common residency 
elements of cohabitation has not been established." 
Haddow v. Haddow at p. 674. 
The Court quoted with approval In re the marriage of Gibson, 
320 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1982) as follows: 
"The time Petitioner's boyfriend spent in the 
dwelling was extensive, easily sufficient to 
qualify as residence if time alone controlled. But 
the time was not spent as a resident. He 
maintained a separate residence and shared none of 
the expenses of this one. He did not even have a 
key or freedom to enter it except when Petitioner 
was present. In simple terms he did not live 
there." 
Additionally, under Utah law, Carolyne Sigg's staying with Vic 
Haynes five to six (5-6) days prior to going to New Zealand in August 
1992, and when returning from New Zealand, for two (2) weeks in February 
44 
1993, does not qualify as "cohabitation" or residing with Mr. Haynes 
under Utah law. Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1980). 
The Court failed to follow settled Utah law by determining 
that Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes began cohabiting in February 1993 
while Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes resided at two (2) separate 
addresses. Alimony should not have been terminated until the end of 
August 1993, when Vic Haynes and Carolyne Sigg purchased a home together 
and moved in. Alimony should be reinstated through the end of August, 
1993, at the rate of $500 per month under the Divorce Decree. 
V. 
FAILURE TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL BASED UPON APPROPRIATE MOTION 
WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
Judge Young's failure to grant Carolyne Sigg's written Motion 
to continue the trial filed prior to trial based upon failure to receive 
and be able to adequately prepare for Elizabeth Stewart's custody 
evaluation, which was again orally made at trial, was prejudicial error. 
The central issue of the Petition for Modification was child custody. 
It is clear from the record that much of Judge Young's decision was 
based upon the custody evaluation. Where it is clear that a party does 
not have access to expert testimony which is critical to the central 
issues of the litigation, it is prejudicial error not to continue the 
trial until a party has adequate time to prepare for the evidence. 
Yates v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 887 (Ariz. App. 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Young has emotionally and financially punished Carolyne 
Sigg by transferring custody of her two minor daughters to Henry Sigg 
and ordering her to pay excessive amounts of fees solely on the basis of 
the oral testimony of Henry Sigg (all of which was disputed) that 
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Carolyne Sigg interfered with visitation for a period of ten (10) months 
out of forty-eight (48) months of Carolyne Sigg's custody. It is 
undisputed that prior to leaving the State of Utah in August, 1991, 
Henry Sigg exercised Court Ordered visitation. After Carolyne Sigg 
moved from the State of Utah, Henry Sigg always received sixty (60) days 
per year visitation as stated in paragraph 2 of the Decree. Temporary 
or permanent move outside of the State, or to New Zealand, was 
specifically addressed in the Divorce Decree. The New Zealand Court 
found no violation of the Utah Divorce Decree. Henry Sigg received 
visitation on three separate occasions in the spring of 1993 and 
exercised full visitation through August, 1993. Henry Sigg's foul and 
abusive telephone messages and language and overly aggressive behavior 
when dealing with Carolyne Sigg on visitation made it impossible for 
"open and free communication", which Henry Sigg now tries to turn to his 
own advantage by alleging interference with visitation. There is simply 
no substantial and material change of circumstances between the date of 
the Divorce Decree and the date of the trial. 
It is undisputed that Carolyne Sigg is a good mother, who has 
been the primary care taker of the children, Nicola and Lindsay Sigg, 
since birth, and that as a result of her care taking, the children are 
healthy, happy, and doing well in school, and are well adjusted. Not 
surprisingly, the Court found that discussions with Henry Sigg created 
"tension in the home" which was used as a basis to change custody. This 
"tension" was given significantly greater credence in changing custody 
than the recognized value of stability of a healthy parenting 
relationship fostering well adjusted children. Elizabeth Stewart's 
testimony regarding Carolyne Sigg crystallizes her bias and gives little 
or no weight to the overriding concerns of this Court regarding 
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stability and maintaining a healthy custodial relationship and regarding 
Henry Sigg, literally turns a blind eye to his failure to timely pay 
alimony and child support, his threats, outrageous language and conduct. 
The "best interests of the children" were simply ignored by the Court 
and the evaluator in favor of protecting Henry Sigg's telephone contact 
with his daughters. 
The fees awarded were punitive in nature where there was no 
violation of the visitation order of the Court and no showing of Henry 
Sigg's need or Carolyne Sigg's ability to pay fees. Termination of 
alimony as of February, 1993, was contrary to the evidence where 
Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes maintained two totally separate households, 
did not share household expenses, mortgage payments, assets, and 
maintained furniture, clothing and personal property in separate 
residences. 
The cumulative effect of the Trial Court's action emasculates 
and pulverizes the traditional legal notions of fostering stability in 
the lives of children of divorced parents, rewarding positive parenting, 
and discouraging foul, inappropriate, and criminal behavior. The Court 
simply ignored precedential direction for and confines on its authority. 
The Amended Decree of Divorce should be reversed in its 
entirety. 
DATED this (Q 'day of January, 1995. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
By: 13. Paul Wood, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Carolyne Sigg 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
CAROLYN BOWDEN SIGG, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HENRY ALFRED SIGG, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 10482 
ooOoo 
The above matter came before the Court on April 3rd and 
April 4, 1991, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, judge presiding for 
trial. The Plaintiff was present in person and represented by 
counsel, Craig M. Peterson. The Defendant was present in person 
and represented by counsel, John B. Mason. The Court having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
does now enter its Decree of Divorce as follows: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Each of the parties are awarded a Decree of Divorce 




2. The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties. There shall be 
reserved in the Defendant reasonable rights of visitation which 
will be consistent with those rights of visitation which have been 
exercised by the Defendant during the pendency of these 
proceedings, every other weekend, every Tuesday and Thursday 
evening, and such other times as the parties may agree. In the 
event the Plaintiff should elect to reside in New Zealand or 
elsewhere outside of the state of Utah, the Defendant shall be 
entitled to exercise extended visitation for up to sixty (60) days 
each year, which visitation shall take into consideration the 
children's school schedules. If the Defendant does exercise 
extended visitation because of Plaintiff's move as herein set out, 
the Defendant is entitled to exercise visitation in two separate 
segments, at his option. 
3. In the event the Plaintiff does not move outside the 
state of Utah, the Defendant shall be entitled to four weeks of 
visitation during the summer for the purpose of exercising 
vacation. In the event the Defendant does not exercise vacation 
during the summer, the Plaintiff shall have rights of visitation 
with the children which are reciprocal to those herein reserved in 
the Defendant. If the Defendant does elect to take vacation with 




children outside of the United States without the Plaintiff's 
consent. The Plaintiff shall not unreasonably withhold her 
consent, and if she does, the matter may be submitted to the Court 
for determination. 
4. The parties shall freely and openly communicate 
regarding actions to be taken in the best interests of the 
children. There shall be reserved in the Defendant the right to 
receive and review the schooling and academic records of the 
children, all medical and dental records, and all social and 
religious records of importance. In those instances where 
duplicate records are not provided by the children's school or 
medical provider, the Plaintiff will forward copies of those 
records to the Defendant, such as the children's report cards and 
parent-teacher notices. The Defendant shall have the right of 
access to school and medical records and to participate in parent-
teacher conferences and other regularly scheduled school activities 
of the children. The parties shall take no action to interfere in 
the enhancement of the other's relationship with the children, nor 
any action which may be construed in any respect as derogatory 
toward the other parent in that relationship. In the accommodation 
and exercise of visitation, the parties will take into the 
consideration of the children's needs to be in attendance at 
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activities and shall give close attention to those activities and 
facilitate the children's participation therein. 
5. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff $344 per 
month per child as child support for a total of $688 per month. 
Child support will be paid in one lump sum on or before the 5th day 
of each month through the Clerk of the Court. Child support shall 
be paid by the Defendant until such time as the minor children 
reach the age of eighteen (18) or graduate from high school with 
their normal graduating class, whichever shall occur later. 
6. The Defendant shall provide health and accident 
insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties. 
Any medical or dental expenses which are incurred for the children 
not paid for by the policy of insurance, shall be shared equally by 
the parties. 
1. The Defendant shall maintain a policy of term 
insurance upon his life in the amount of $100,000, naming the minor 
children as beneficiaries thereunder. Such policy shall be 
maintained until the Defendant is no longer required to pay child 
support pursuant to the provisions of this Decree or further orders 
of this Court. 
8. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$500 per month as and for alimony, which alimony shall terminate as 




be paid in one lump sum on or before the 5th day of each month 
through the Clerk of the Court. 
9, The Plaintiff shall be awarded all right, title and 
interest in real and personal property as follows: 
a. The home and real property located at 2724 
Creek Drive, Park City, Utah, and the Defendant shall execute a 
Quit Claim Deed in favor of the Plaintiff for said property 
forthwith. 
b. All furniture, furnishings and personal 
property currently in possession of the Plaintiff. 
c. The 1987 Mercedes Benz 260E automobile. 
d. All cash accounts or savings accounts currently 
in her name. 
e. All right to any proceeds from the Monarch Life 
Insurance policy held in her name. 
f. All right to her Merrill Lynch independent 
retirement account. 
g. The right to take custodial control of the 
savings account of the parties' minor child, Niki Sigg. 
10. The Defendant shall be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to real and personal property as follows: 
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a. All interest in the Sigg Family Partnership and 
the Plaintiff shall Quit Claim any interest she may have therein in 
favor of the Defendant, which interest is as follows: 
1. The real property and residence located at 
839 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah; 
2. The real property and residence located at 
835 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah; 
3. The real property known as Lot #265, 
Highland Estates. 
b. All furniture, furnishings and personal 
property currently in Defendant's possession. 
c. All cash and savings accounts currently held in 
Defendant's name. 
d. All right and interest the parties may have in 
Cougar Energy. 
e. The Monarch Life Insurance policy currently in 
Defendant's name. 
f. The Defendant's Merrill Lynch independent 
retirement account held in his name. 
g. Twelve (12) water shares in High Valley Water 
Company. 
h. Any and all interest the parties may have in 
the business known as MountainTops, Inc. 
00UJ(j. t 
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11. There are certain checks belonging to the parties 
which are currently in possession of Defendant's attorney. The 
value of these checks will be divided equally between the parties 
and counsel for the Defendant shall execute checks to each of the 
parties forthwith. 
12. The outstanding liabilities incurred by the parties 
during the marriage shall be paid by each of them as follows: 
a. The Plaintiff shall assume and pay outstanding 
liabilities as follows: 
1. The outstanding first mortgage owed on the 
parties' marital residence at 2724 Creek 
Drive. 
2. The outstanding liability owed to Chase 
Bank for the Mercedes automobile. 
3. Any and all liabilities which she has 
incurred in her own name since the 
parties' separation from and after 
June, 1990. 
b. The Defendant shall assume and pay outstanding 
liabilities as follows: 
1. All Sigg Family Partnership liabilities. 
2. The outstanding mortgage payment owed to 
Lucy Strieker for the real property 
B00KKXPWP636 00UJG' 
located at 839 Woodside Avenue, Park City, 
Utah. 
The outstanding mortgage payment owed to 
Chase Bank for the real property located 
at 839 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah. 
The outstanding mortgage owed to Colonial 
Savings on the real property located at 
835 Woodside Avenue, Park City, Utah. 
Any outstanding liability which Defendant 
owes for 1989 income taxes. 
The outstanding liability owed to Monarch 
Life Insurance Company for loans taken 
by the Defendant on his life insurance 
policy. 
The outstanding liability owed to High 
Valley Water Company for the water shares 
being awarded to the Defendant. 
Any and all liability associated with or 
arising from the parties' business known 
as MountainTops, Inc., including the 
"Line of Credit." 
Any and all liabilities the Defendant has 




parties' separation of June, 1990. 
13. Each party shall file and pay their 1990 state and 
federal income taxes individually. The Defendant shall provide to 
the Plaintiff a copy of the 1990 income tax returns he files, and 
he shall provide Plaintiff with a copy of his income tax return 
which he files for each year thereafter. Said copies are to be 
provided to the Plaintiff at the same time as the Defendant files 
the returns. 
14. The Defendant shall take all action necessary to 
immediately remove the mortgage from the marital residence which 
secures the "Line of Credit" used to finance the parties business, 
MountainTops, Inc., and he shall secure the "Line of Credit" with 
the real property owned by MountainTops, Inc. Further, the 
Defendant shall use his best efforts to cause the mortgage on the 
real property known as Lot #265, Highland Estates, to be removed 
from that property as soon as possible and to transfer that 
liability so that the real property owned by MountainTops, Inc., 
will act as security in place and in lieu of Lot #265, Highland 
Estates, for the "Line of Credit." 
15. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$60,000 as equalization of the property distribution between the 
parties. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff $25,000 cash on 
or before June 2, 1991. The Defendant shall also pay to the 
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Plaintiff the sum of $40,000, without interest, on or before April 
1, 1992. The Defendant shall execute a Promissory Note in the 
amount of $40,000 and shall give Plaintiff a Deed of Trust to 
secure that note on the property owned by MountainTops, Inc. The 
Deed of Trust given to the Plaintiff shall be second only to the 
secured position given to the financial institution when the real 
property owned by MountainTops, Inc. is used to secure the "Line of 
Credit," which the Defendant is required to transfer from the 
marital residence and Lot #265, Highland Estates, as hereinbefore 
provided. Further, as additional security for the note, the 
Defendant shall give Plaintiff a Trust Deed for Lot #265, Highland 
Estates. This Promissory Note and Trust Deed shall become first 
position on the Highland Estates property when the real property 
owned by MountainTops, Inc., becomes the security for the "Line of 
Credit" used by the business. The real property owned by 
MountainTops, Inc. shall not be used to secure a "Line of Credit" 
which exceeds the current "Line of Credit" available that is now 
secured by the marital residence and Lot #265, Highland Estates, 
until such time as Defendant has satisfied this obligation owed to 
the Plaintiff. 
16. The Defendant shall be required to make certain that 
all payments, registration or taxes due on the property being 
awarded to the Plaintiff are current as of April 3, 1991. 
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17. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
Defendant in the amount of $17,500 as and for attorney's fees and 
costs which the Plaintiff has incurred in this matter. 
DATED this (((? day of April, 1991. 
BY THE^OURT: 
District Court Judge ) 









Exhibit "2" Motion to Continue Trial, June 14, 1994 
.SO., 
ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN BOWDEN SIGG, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
VS. ; 
HENRY ALFRED SIGG, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL 
) Civil No. 89 43 10482 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff hereby moves the court for continuance of the trial of the petition to modify the 
decree of divorce in the above-entitled matter presently scheduled for June 14, 1994, at 9:00 a.m. 
The grounds for this motion are as follows: 
1. The custody evaluation has not yet been completed. The parties are informed by 
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the custody evaluator, that the evaluation will be completed some time 
Friday, June 10,1994. This is inadequate time to prepare the case for trial. 
2. Discovery has not yet been completed. As of the time of this motion, defendant 
has not yet indicated what his income is. It is impossible properly to calculate child support 
without such income information. 
OOiiL'.'::,, 
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3. Defendant has not answered plaintiffs interrogatories or formally responded to 
plaintiffs request for production of documents, although seven boxes of documents have been 
made available for inspection and copying within the last few days. Based on the documentation 
made available to date, it is not possible to determine defendant's income. In addition, it is 
impossible to review the documents within the time allowed. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for continuance of the trial should be 
granted. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1994. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
By. s^ 
ELLEN M^#COCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I transmitted a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL to the following, via facsimile transmission, this 9th day of 
January, 1994: 
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 




Exhibit "3" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
September 29, 1994 
Clark W. Sessions (2914) 
Dean C. Andreasen (3981) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone (801) 537-5555 
j Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
i 
( IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i 
i 
CAROLYNE JOAN SIGG, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
, HENRY ALFRED SIGG, : Civil No. 10482 
i 
| Defendant. : Judge David S. Young 
! 
J Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause and Defendant's Verified 
I Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and related matters 
I came on regularly for trial before the Honorable David S. Young one 
! of the Judges of the Court on June 14 and 15, 1994. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by Ellen Maycock, Esq. of Kruse, Landa & 
Maycock, her attorneys. Defendant was present and represented by 
j Clark W. Sessions, Esq. and Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. of Campbell 
| Maack & Sessions, his attorneys. The Court heard and considered 
I 
! the sworn testimony of the parties and various witnesses, received 
' and reviewed exhibits and documentary evidence offered by the 
i 
parties, heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and 
I O0UU7-
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reviewed the files and records herein. On September 23, 1994, the 
Court heard argument from counsel for the parties on Plaintiff's 
Objections to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Decree of Divorce. The Court being fully advised in the 
premises now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Decree of Divorce/Order and Judgment 
1. That the marriage of the parties was terminated by a 
Decree of Divorce entered on April 17, 1991. 
2. That the Decree of Divorce, in relevant part, provided as 
follows: 
a. Plaintiff was awarded the sole custody of Nicola 
Sigg and Lindsay Sigg, the minor children of the parties. 
Defendant was awarded reasonable rights of visitation. At the time 
the Decree of Divorce was entered, the parties anticipated that 
Plaintiff might "elect to reside in New Zealand or elsewhere 
outside of the State of Utah." In such event, the Decree of 
Divorce provided that Defendant would be entitled to exercise 
extended visitation for up to sixty days each year. 
b. The parties were ordered to "freely and openly 
communicate regarding actions to be taken in the best interests of 
the children." Defendant was awarded the right to receive and 
review all school, medical, dental, social and religious records of 
importance. Defendant was awarded the right to participate in the 
childrenfs school activities including parent-teacher conferences 
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and programs. The parties were ordered to "take no action to 
interfere in the enhancement of the other's relationship with the 
children, nor any action which may be construed in any respect as 
derogatory toward the other parent in that relationship. 
c. Plaintiff was awarded from Defendant child support 
in the amount of $688.00 per month. 
d. Defendant was ordered to provide health insurance 
for the benefit of the minor children. The parties were ordered to 
equally pay for all uninsured medical costs incurred for the 
I benefit of the minor children. 
e. Plaintiff was awarded from Defendant alimony in the 
I amount of $500.00 per month to "terminate as provided by law or 
I upon further Order of this Court." 
I 
f. Plaintiff was awarded, among other items, the 
marital home located in Park City subject to the mortgage thereon, 
$65,000.00 as equalization of the property distribution between the 
parties and $17,500.00 as attorney's fees. 
g. Defendant was awarded, among other items, certain 
real property subject to the mortgages thereon, and certain 
partnership and business interests. 
3. That on September 24, 1991, the Court entered an Order 
j and Judgment. The Order and Judgment provided, in relevant part as 
J follows: 
I a. Defendant was ordered to obtain a health insurance 
I policy for the benefit of the minor children with "a deductible of 
not more than $200.00 • However, in the event there is a 
jl substantial difference in cost by obtaining a health and accident 
,' insurance policy with a deductible amount of $500.00, then the 
ij 
j| Defendant shall be allowed to maintain such an insurance policy." 
ii b. "The parties shall begin to cooperate to facilitate 
,j visitation. Further, in the event the Defendant is going to be 
ij late in picking up the children or returning them, he shall be 
I! required to call the Plaintiff and advise her accordingly." 
i Termination Of Alimony Due To Cohabitation 
4. That Defendant paid to Plaintiff alimony through April 
1993, in the amount of $500.00 per month but has paid no alimony 
since that time based on his claim that Plaintiff was and is 
cohabiting with one Victor Haynes. 
,, 5. That in the summer of 1992, following the sale of the 
•i 
I marital residence awarded to her in the divorce, Plaintiff and the 
• i 
j| parties1 minor children traveled to Boulder, Colorado where she and 
the parties1 minor children lived with Mr. Haynes for approximately 
five days until she and the minor children traveled to Disneyland 
and to New Zealand. 
6. That prior to traveling to New Zealand, while residing in 
Boulder, Colorado, Plaintiff had no place of residence other than 
with Mr. Haynes; that her personal effects were located there and 
that Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes effectively resided together and 
!j maintained an on-going relationship including sexual intercourse 
I; 
i| admitted to by the Plaintiff. 
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7. That Mr. Haynes traveled to New Zealand during the 1992 
Christmas holiday and resided with Plaintiff for approximately a 
|! two week period. 
I 8. In or about February 1993, Plaintiff and the minor 
I children returned to Boulder, Colorado from New Zealand. 
I Plaintiff's primary reason for returning to Boulder, Colorado was 
II to continue her relationship with Mr. Haynes. 
I 9. That following her return from New Zealand to Boulder, 
j Colorado in February 1993, the parties in effect resided together 
!J even though for some period of time they had separate condominiums 
in the same condominium complex. 
10. That while residing in Boulder, Colorado, following her 
I] return from New Zealand, Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes maintained a 
i 
11 continuing relationship including sexual intercourse; shared living 
I expenses; shared open access to each other's condominium units 
J either by reason of a key which Mr. Haynes was given by Plaintiff 
or access to a hidden key, the location of which was disclosed by 
the Plaintiff to Mr. Haynes; ate meals together and shared expenses 
for food and incidentals; maintained their clothing in the same 
condominium; used the same furniture; Mr. Haynes parked his 
I automobile on occasion at Plaintiff's residence; and Plaintiff and 
Mr. Haynes otherwise lived as though they were husband and wife. 
I 11. That in or about August 1993, Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes 
j acquired a residence and real property together in Boulder, 
II Colorado and do not dispute that they cohabited each with the other 
ji 
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I1 12. That based on the foregoing findings of fact, Plaintiff 
I and Mr. Haynes began to cohabit no later than February 1993 and, 
ii 
I
 accordingly, Defendant's obligation for alimony should terminate as 
t 
t of February 1993. 
!
 13. That based on the foregoing findings of fact, Defendant 
1
 has over paid Plaintiff $1,000.00 for alimony and should receive 
,»• credit in that amount against his child support obligation. 
Health Insurance 
|| 14. That the Decree of Divorce requires Defendant to provide 
i health and accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children 
i of the parties and further that the parties have agreed that 
!i 
II Defendant maintain such insurance with a deductible between the 
ii 
I j amounts of $200.00 and $500.00. 
, i 
II 15. That in order to reduce the premiums for such insurance, 
i! 
J it is reasonable that the Defendant provide insurance with a 
| deductible of $1,000.00 provided that he pay the first $750.00 of 
11 medical expenses for the care and treatment of the parties' minor 




|i 16. That it is reasonable that if Plaintiff is able to obtain 
|j health and medical insurance through her employment at a better or 
, reduced rate at no cost to her, she should acquire such insurance 
i and save Defendant that cost. 
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I Child Care 
I 17. That Plaintiff has, until very recently been employed by 
I Mr. Haynes and worked out of the home she acquired with Mr. Haynes 
in Boulder, Colorado. 
18. That while Plaintiff could not work as fully and without 
! interruption out of a home with children present as she could 
j without the children being present, the majority of the child care 
i 
1
 costs incurred were not necessary. Plaintiff withdrew her claim 
I for day care costs attributable to Ms. Margaret Braae in open 
Court. While the evidence was not clear as to the allocation of 
expenses between the parties' two minor children, it is equitable 
(that of the total amount claimed due and owing to Children's World 
Learning Center principally for the day care of Lindsay Sigg in the 
I amount of $2,816.00 for the year 1993 and $1,461 for the year 1994 
| through April 22 or a total of $4,277, one-third thereof or $1,425 
should be the sole responsibility of the Plaintiff and the balance 
should be assumed and paid by the parties equally. 
19. That it is equitable that the parties equally share any 
necessary employment-related child care costs incurred in the 
I future. 
Attorney's Fees 
20. That as more fully hereinafter set forth, Defendant has 
been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position to assert his 
parental rights of visitation due to Plaintiff's actions, which 
i 
I actions are without excuse or justification. 
7 
21. That Defendant has been required to incur attorney's fees 
and costs in enforcing the provisions of the Decree of Divorce and 
the Order and Judgment. 
22. That Plaintiff's conduct as hereinafter more fully set 
I forth was so extreme in nature that it is appropriate and equitable 
J to require Plaintiff to bear some of Defendant's attorneys' fees 
I and costs relative to his Petition to Modify. 
23. That it is equitable that Plaintiff assume and pay 
j 
j Defendant's costs and expenses incurred in connection with these 
j| proceedings in the amount of $9,302.48 to Campbell Maack & Sessions 
through May 31, 1994, and further that Defendant's counsel is 
authorized to submit to the Court an affidavit of fees and costs 
II incurred from May 31, 1994, through the conclusion of this matter 
) for further consideration by the Court. 
| 24. That it is equitable that Plaintiff pay Defendant's costs 
i j 
and expenses connected with his travel to Boulder, Colorado on 
December 20, 1993, in the amount of $250.00, the impoundment of his 
I vehicle in the amount of $60.00 and the attorneys' fees charged by 
I Michael Enwall, Esq. in his representation of Defendant in a 
|j pending criminal proceeding initiated at the behest and insistence 
j of Victor Haynes with the knowledge of Plaintiff. Said attorney's 
II fees are in the amount of $1,000.00. 
j ! 
i | 
|| 25. That the charges and expenses of Elizabeth Stewart, Ph.D. 
|: of $2,000 for the evaluation plus her testimony at trial in the sum 




I review of documents shall be paid by Plaintiff. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant the amount of $2,683.34 for the 
amounts Defendant has paid Dr. Stewart. Plaintiff has already paid 
! Dr. Stewart $350.00. 
I 26. That it is equitable that the parties otherwise pay their 
j own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this case. 
i 
! Custody/Visitation 
| 27. That the Decree of Divorce provides that the parties 
shall freely and openly communicate regarding actions to be taken 
I in the best interests of the children, that Plaintiff will forward 
copies of the children's school and medical records to the 
Defendant, including the children's report cards and parent-teacher 
i 
1 notices. 
28. That Plaintiff has not complied with those provisions 
i since moving from Park City, Utah in 1992. 
29. That during the spring of 1992 when Plaintiff sold her 
I residence and made plans to leave Park City permanently, she did 
I not advise Defendant of such plans in writing or otherwise nor did 
she advise Defendant that she was going to Boulder, Colorado to 
stay with Mr. Haynes nor to travel to New Zealand. Further, she 
failed to make any arrangements for the parties' children to visit 
i with Defendant while she was out of state. 
30. That Plaintiff traveled to New Zealand with the parties' 
J children and stayed at her parents' residence. Defendant found out 
! that Plaintiff had traveled to New Zealand and spoke with her by 
j 9 000G7d 
telephone within minutes of her arrival. Defendantf s subsequent 
telephone calls to learn of the whereabouts of his children were 
not accepted or no information about the children was given by 
Plaintiff or her parents to Defendant. 
31. That Plaintiff while in New Zealand moved from her 
parents home to a friends home, but did not provide Defendant with 
a telephone number or other information so that visitation could be 
arranged. Similarly, Plaintiff's parents would not provide 
Defendant with a telephone number or other information about the 
whereabouts of Plaintiff or the minor children. Neither Plaintiff 
nor her parents were candid or forthcoming in providing 
information. 
32. That Defendant was required to hire a private detective 
to locate his children and traveled to New Zealand where he 
remained for a period of approximately five weeks. Defendant hired 
counsel and instituted a proceeding in New Zealand relating to 
visitation with and custody of his children. The New Zealand court 
found that Plaintiff had not violated the Utah divorce decree for 
the reason that insufficient time had elapsed to establish whether 
Plaintiff would permit 60 days of visitation within the one year 
period of her having left the State of Utah during the summer of 
1992. While mediation was attempted, Defendant, in the entire five 
week period while in New Zealand, saw his children on only one 
occasion in the presence of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's father for a 
10 
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period of less than two hours even though requests for visitation 
were made continuously by Defendant. 
33. That when Plaintiff moved to Boulder, Colorado with the 
children and later purchased a home in 1993 with Mr. Haynes, 
!| Defendant was only given a business telephone number (the only 
»i 
1( number available for a period of time) through which he could 
I contact his children and Defendant became frustrated and angry when 
!l 
II his calls met with answering machine messages and finally 
i 
11 instructions from Mr. Haynes that the Defendant could only speak 
!
 with his children two evenings each week at 7:00 p.m. 
11 Subsequently, a personal telephone line was obtained but Plaintiff 
.! was not candid or forthcoming in providing the number to Defendant. 
•I 34. That Defendant visited with the children in August 1992 
11 on the east coast for a family reunion. Defendant and the minor 
I children informed Plaintiff that the children would be returned 
late. Plaintiff should have consented to such since the request 
was reasonable and Defendant was not attempting to annoy Plaintiff. 
However, due to the animosity between the parties, Plaintiff would 
not consent to the additional days of visitation. Defendant was 
late returning the children from time to time although he informed 
Plaintiff of late returns due to weather conditions, plane 
schedules and other situations. 
35. That Defendant, pursuant to a pre-arranged agreement with 
i Plaintiff, traveled to Boulder, Colorado on December 20, 1993, to 
.! n 
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visit with his children during the Christmas holiday between 
December 20 and 30, 1993. 
36. That Plaintiff informed Defendant that he could pick up 
the children but he could do so only at a lot adjacent to a bank in 
Boulder, Colorado at 10:00 a.m. on December 20 and further that 
|; notwithstanding his objection to picking up the children in a 
I commercial parking lot, he traveled to the appointed place and when 
i |l the children were not present at the appointed time, called the 
' I 
j residence of Plaintiff and Mr. Haynes from a mobile telephone. 
'I 37. That when there was no answer, he returned to his vehicle 
ij 
|j and was thereupon arrested and incarcerated based upon a telephone 
j harassment complaint filed by Mr. Haynes with the knowledge of 
h Plaintiff. 
i j 
!j 38. That Plaintiff did not deliver the children to the 
l| 
i! appointed place notwithstanding her agreement to do so and 
following the posting of bail by Defendant he was denied visitation 
| with his children other than in the presence of a social worker in 
i 
a supervised situation which he declined and thereafter returned to 
ii the State of Utah. 
39. That Lindsay Sigg stated to Dr. Stewart her preference to 
j| live with her father and gave good reasons therefor, most of which 
I! related to her not caring for Mr. Haynes. Further, that the 
| parties' child Nicola was less definite in her preference, but 
j I expressed problems she had with Mr. Haynes. 
r 
i 
I 40. That since the divorce of the parties, Defendant has 
remarried and his current wife Amy has a daughter with whom the 
parties1 minor children have a warm and comfortable relationship. 
41. That the parties1 minor children are doing well in school 
I and there is no reason to believe that they would not continue to 
1 progress and achieve in the Park City school system with which the 
parties' oldest child is familiar and in which she was been 
l enrolled. 
I 
I 42. That the children are closely bonded with each of their 
j parents with the exception that tension has been created by 
Plaintiff because of her limiting or controlling the children's 
contact with Defendant and further that Defendant has made 
I considerable sacrifices to be close to his children and was even 
j willing to sell his businesses and move to their domicile, if 
j 
I necessary, in order to be with his children. 
43. That the custody and visitation arrangements worked well 
during the first fifteen months following the parties1 divorce, but 
I deteriorated steadily since Plaintiff departed with the children to 
Colorado and New Zealand and she has failed to facilitate 
visitation with the children except on her terms which are not in 
I their best interests. 
I 44. That the children were born and raised in Park City, 
Utah, attended school and pre-school there and are generally 
j acquainted and comfortable with their surroundings there. 
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45. That the environment offered by Defendant is a stable one 
with permanent employment, a satisfactory remarriage relationship 
and extended family and friends with whom the parties' minor 
children are acquainted. 
46. That the findings in relationship to the legal factors to 
be considered as specified and detailed by Dr. Stewart are adopted 
herein as the findings of the Court and further that the 
recommendations that Dr. Stewart has made are well founded in fact. 
47. That although Plaintiff has been an attentive mother who 
was not neglecting the minor children, and the minor children were 
generally doing well in her custody, it is in the best interests of 
the parties' minor children that custody be changed from Plaintiff 
to Defendant for the principal reason, among others, that Defendant 
will facilitate visitation between Plaintiff and the minor children 
whereas Plaintiff has a history of interfering with Defendant's 
visitation with the minor children. It is in the best interests of 
the minor children that a relationship with both parents be 
fostered. The probability of a healthy relationship being fostered 
with both parents will be enhanced if Defendant is the custodial 
parent. The change in custody should become effective July 1, 
1994. There should be visitation that should be liberally granted 
by Defendant to Plaintiff which would include a significant summer 
visitation with Plaintiff. 
14 
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48. That it is in the children's best interest that they 
should be enrolled in the Park City School District during the next 
academic year while residing with Defendant. 
|l 49. That the Court adopts the statutory visitation schedule 
il 
11 but it is in the best interests that such visitation schedule be 
I, viewed as a minimum and that additional visitation be made 
11 available. 
|j 50. That it is in the children's best interest that they 
il j should have complete and open access to both parents by telephone 
!i and that all private telephone numbers should be given to the 
| children and to the parties hereto. 
;! 51. That it is in the children's best interest that Victor 
If Haynes be excluded from any involvement whatsoever in the 
.1 
ji relationship of the children with their father and that Mr. Haynes 
should not interfere with that relationship in any respect and that 
he should be so advised by Plaintiff. 
Child Support 
52. That based on the foregoing findings of fact determining 
that Defendant has overpaid Plaintiff $1,000.00 for alimony and 
jl should receive a credit in that amount against his child support 
j! 
|| obligation, the Court otherwise finds that Defendant is delinquent 
!i 
11 in his child support obligations under the Decree of Divorce and 
;! 
»| the Order and Judgment in the amount of $37.50 for February 1994, 
ij $688.00 for May 1994 and $668.00 for June 1994, which amounts 
i | should be offset against any amounts Plaintiff owes Defendant. 
i 
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Further, Defendant owes Plaintiff $263.94 for various medical 
expense reimbursement which amount should be offset against any 
amounts Plaintiff owes Defendant. 
53. That the parties have stipulated for purposes of this 
action, Plaintiff's gross monthly income is $2,800.00 and 
Defendant's gross monthly income is $4,333.00. 
54. That pursuant to the Child Support Obligation Worksheet 
I attached hereto as Exhibit A, child support is awarded to Defendant 
i 
j from Plaintiff in the amount of $466.00 per month for the two minor 
1
 children commencing July 1, 1994, and continuing each month 
i 
| thereafter until a child attains the age of 18 years or graduates 
J from high school, if later, or otherwise becomes emancipated, at 
!
 which time child support shall cease for that child, and child 
i 
j support shall be recomputed for the remaining child. 
i 
I 55. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-45-7.11, child 
! support shall be reduced by fifty percent (50%) for each child for 
i 
J time periods during which Plaintiff has extended visitation with 
that child for at least 25 of 30 consecutive days. 
j 56. That an immediate withhold an deliver order shall be 
j entered pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. section 62A-
11-401 et seq., relative to Plaintiff's child support obligation 
I including an order assessing against Plaintiff an additional $7.00 
i 
I per month as a check processing fee to be included in the amount 
withheld. 
j 
57. That the parties shall equally pay for one-half of all 
necessary and reasonable travel costs associated with the exercise 
of visitation. 
58. That based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
finds that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred and, 
accordingly, the Decree of Divorce and the Order and Judgment 
should be modified as set forth herein. 
BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and adopts the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff and Victor Haynes entered into a 
cohabitation arrangement as of the end of February 1993, and as 
such, no alimony is due or payable by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff after the end of February 1993. 
2. That Defendant should be given credit for alimony 
payments made for the months of March and April 1993 in the total 
amount of $1,000 against obligations, if any, he owes to Plaintiff. 
3. That Defendant should be ordered to maintain medical 
insurance with a deductible of $1,000 but he should pay the first 
$750 of medical expenses annually for the care and treatment of the 
parties' minor children and that thereafter the parties shall bear 
all uninsured medical expenses equally. 
4. That if Plaintiff can obtain medical insurance through 
her employment at a better or reduced rate, she shall do so. 
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5. That one-third of the day care expenses incurred by the 
Plaintiff of $1,425.00 are her sole responsibility and that the 
balance of $2,852.00 shall be assumed and paid by the parties 
equally. 
6. That Plaintiff shall assume and pay the fees and costs 
and expenses incurred by the Defendant to Campbell Maack & Sessions 
in the amount of $9,302.48 through May 31, 1994, and such 
additional amounts as the Court may subsequently determine by 
affidavit submitted by Defendant's counsel. 
7. That Plaintiff shall assume, pay and discharge the costs 
and expenses of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart in the total sum of $3,033.34 
by reimbursing Defendant the amount of $2,683.34. Plaintiff has 
already paid Dr. Stewart the amount of $350.00. 
8. That Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant for costs 
incurred relative to the Boulder visitation on December 20, 1993, 
in the amount of $310.00, and further that Plaintiff shall pay 
Defendant's attorneyf s fees and costs in the defense of the 
criminal action initiated at the behest and insistence of Victor 
Haynes in the amount of $1,000.00. 
9. That the parties shall bear their own costs and expenses 
including attorneys1 fees incurred in connection herewith other 
than as hereinabove set forth. 
10. That Victor Haynes should be excluded from any 
involvement or interference with the relationship of Defendant with 
the minor children and Plaintiff shall so advise him. 
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I 11. That the children should be provided complete and open 
access to both parents by telephone, that all private telephone 
numbers shall be given to the children and to the other party. 
12. That there has been a significant change of circumstances 
with respect to the custody and visitation as previously ordered by 
I) the Court. 
13. That there has been a flagrant disregard of the rights of 
j|Defendant by Plaintiff and no desire to be flexible, cooperative or 
I supportive. 
'! 14. That the custody of the parties' minor children shall be 
!l 
11 changed from Plaintiff to Defendant as of July 1, 1994 and 
, Plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable visitation rights with the 
Mparties' minor children to include at least a minimum the standard 
il 
!l statutory visitation schedule. 
il 
ji 15. That the children shall be enrolled in the Park City 
i1 School District during the next academic year. 
I 16. That Defendant is delinquent in his child support and 
!J medical reimbursement payments in the amounts of $1,413.50 and 
l| 
ji$263.94, which should be offset against amounts owed by Defendant 
j! to Plaintiff. 
ji 
I 17. That Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant as and for child 
ij 
II support the sum of $466.00 per month in accordance with the child 
ij support worksheet, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
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1 
18. That the Court shall make and enter its amendment to the 
Decree of Divorce accordingly. 
DATED this I^T^lay of ^j^pjit^^ 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
l 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
^ \ ! l l l ^ 7 " " 4 
DAVID S. 
District 
?^/' SUMMIT Yo% 
= 0: 
^ COUNTY / ^ 
Ellen Maycock/ 
Attorneys kor Defendant 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
i A J-tyy /, /Y^^zA l^/M.-/] 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the^^Lday of September, 1994, I 
caused the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be 
hand-delivered to the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West 300 South, Suite 800 




,W THE Third DISTRICT C^ c 
Summit COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
yne Joan Sigg 
vs. 
Alfred Sigg 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civil No. 89-4310482 
! Mother | Father | Combined j 
mber of natural and adopted !////////////!////////////! ! 
ildren of this mother and father.j////////////!////////////! 2 
ross monthly income. !$ 2800 !$ 4333 !///////////! 
reviously ordered alimony i ! !///////////! 
ctually paid. !- 0 |- 0 !///////////! 
reviously ordered child support. |- 0 |- 0 !///////////! 
ptional: Share of child support | j !///////////! 
bligation for children in |- 0 j- 0 !///////////! 
resent home. ! ! j ! 
justed Monthly Gross for child ! ! ! ! 
pport purposes. !$ 2800 |$ 4333 !$ 7133 ! 
se Combined Support !////////////!////////////! ! 
ligation (both parents). !////////////!////////////!$ 1188 j 
rcentage of COMBINED adjusted i i !///////////! 
mthly gross. ! 39.25 %| 60.75 %!///////////! 
ich parent's share of Base | ! !///////////! 
ipport Obligation. !$ 466 |$ 722 !///////////! 
iildrenfs portion of monthly | ! !///////////! 
tdical and dental insurance | ! !///////////! 
erniums paid to insurance company.!- 0 |- 0 !///////////! 
mthly work or training related !////////////!////////////! ! 
tild care expense. !////////////!////////////!$ 0 ! 
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Adjusted Base Child Support Award. 
Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child 

















00U69^ EXHIBIT A 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theT^i-yjLday of September, 1994, I 
caused the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be 
hand-delivered to the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West 300 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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.,* THE Third DISTRICT C i 
Summit COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
:arolyne Joan Sigg 
vs, 
lenry Alfred Sigg 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civil No. 89-4310482 
! Mother J Father ! Combined j 
L. Number of natural and adopted !////////////!////////////! 
children of this mother and father.j////////////!////////////! 2 j 
>a. Gross monthly income. !$ 2800 !$ 4333 !///////////! 
lb. Previously ordered alimony ! ! !///////////! 
actually paid. j- 0 i- 0 i///////////! 
Ic. Previously ordered child support, j- 0 j- 0 \///////////\ 
Id. Optional: Share of child support | J !///////////! 
obligation for children in |- 0 i- 0 !///////////! 
present home. ! ! ! ! 
1. Adjusted Monthly Gross for child ! ! ! ! 
support purposes. !$ 2800 !$ 4333 |$ 7133 j 
1. Base Combined Support \////////////\////////////\ I 
obligation (both parents). ',////////////\////////////\$ 1188 | 
5. Percentage of COMBINED adjusted ! ! !///////////! 
monthly gross. ! 39.25 %! 60.75 %!///////////! 
5. Each parent's share of Base ! ! !///////////! 
Support Obligation. !$ 466 !$ 722 !///////////! 
7. Children1s portion of monthly ! j !///////////! 
medical and dental insurance ! ! I///////////! 
premiums paid to insurance company.',- 0 i- 0 !///////////! 
3. Monthly work or training related \////////////\////////////\ ! 





BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Adjusted Base Child Support Award. 
Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "4" Amended Decree of Divorce. September 29. 1994 
Clark W. Sessions (2914) 
Dean C. Andreasen (3981) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
No. 
Br 
F I L E D 
SEP 29 1994 (=./(,( 
Clerk of Summit County , ~ , 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
jj CAROLYNE JOAN SIGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Civil No. 10482 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause and Defendant's Verified 
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and related matters 
came on regularly for trial before the Honorable David S. Young one 
of the Judges of the Court on June 14, and 15, 1994. Plaintiff was 
present and represented by Ellen Maycock, Esq. of Kruse, Landa & 
Maycock, her attorneys. Defendant was present and represented by 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. and Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. of Campbell 
! Maack & Sessions, his attorneys. On September 23, 1994, the Court 
j heard argument from counsel for the parties on Plaintiff's 
i 
i Objections to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
j Law and Decree of Divorce. The Court having heretofore made and 
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entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereby orders, 
adjudges and decrees as follows: 
1. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce entered on 
April 17, 1991 (the "Decree") and paragraph 6 of the Order and 
Judgment entered on September 24, 1991 (the "Order"), are hereby 
deleted and the following substituted therefore: 
That Defendant be and he is hereby awarded the 
permanent care, custody and control of the minor children 
of the parties and Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation with the partiesf minor 
children as the parties may agree but to include, at a 
minimum, the standard statutory visitation schedule, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," The 
parties1 minor children should be provided complete and 
open access to both parties by telephone and all private 
telephone numbers shall be given to the children and to 
each of the parties and further that the parties minor 
children shall be enrolled in the Park City School 
District during the next academic year. 
That the parties shall freely and openly communicate 
regarding actions to be taken in the best interest of 
their children and shall have the right of access to 
school and medical records and to participate in 
parent/teacher conferences and regularly scheduled school 
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activities of the children• In the exercise of 
visitation rights the parties will take into 
consideration the children's schedules, commitments, 
needs and requirements and shall take no action to 
interfere in the enhancement of the other's relationship 
with the children nor pursue any action or conduct which 
is in any respect derogatory or demeaning toward the 
other parent in their relationship with their minor 
children. 
Victor Haynes is excluded from any involvement or 
interference with the relationship of Defendant with the 
minor children and Plaintiff shall so advise him. 
2. Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is deleted and the 
following substituted therefore: 
Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant as child support 
the amount of Four Hundred Sixty Six Dollars ($466.00) 
per month for the two minor children commencing July 1, 
1994, and continuing each month thereafter until a child 
attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high 
school, if later, or otherwise becomes emancipated, at 
which time child support shall cease for that child, and 
child support shall be recomputed for the remaining 
child. 
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-45-7.11, child 
support shall be reduced by fifty percent (50%) for each 
child for time periods during which Plaintiff has 
extended visitation with that child for at least 25 of 30 
consecutive days. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 62A-11-401 et 
seq., an immediate withhold and deliver order shall be 
entered relative to Plaintiff's child support obligation 
including an order assessing against Plaintiff an 
additional $7.00 per month as a check processing fee to 
be included in the amount. 
The parties shall equally pay for all necessary and 
reasonable travel costs associated with the exercise of 
visitation. 
3. Paragraph 6 of the Decree and paragraph 3 of the Order 
are hereby deleted and the following substituted therefore: 
That Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain medical 
insurance covering the parties f minor children during the 
period child support is payable hereunder with a 
deductible of $1,000.00 provided that Defendant is 
ordered to pay the first $750.00 of medical expenses 
annually for the care and treatment of the parties' minor 
children and that thereafter the parties are ordered to 
equally pay all uninsured medical expenses. In the event 
4 
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Plaintiff is able to obtain medical insurance through her 
employment at a better or reduced rate, she is ordered to 
do so and in such event Defendant is ordered to insure 
the excess coverage. 
4. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree are hereby deleted. 
5. Paragraph 18 is added to the Decree as follows: 
18. That Defendant is awarded judgment against 
Plaintiff for the amount of $10,192.38 calculated as 
follows and as may be augmented as provided herein: the 
amount of $1,000.00 constituting an overpayment of 
alimony for the months of March and April, 1993; legal 
fees and costs to Campbell Maack & Sessions through May 
31, 1994 in the sum of $9,302.48 to be augmented as the 
Court may determine; fees of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart paid 
by Defendant in the amount of $2,683.34; the amount of 
$310.00 relative to Defendant's visit to Boulder, 
Colorado in December 1993; the attorney's fees charged by 
Michael Enwall in the amount of $1,000.00; less 
Defendant's share of work-related day care expenses of 
$1,426.00; less the amount of $1,413.50 for past due 
child support owed by Defendant; less the amount of 
$263.94 for medical reimbursement owed by Defendant. 
5 
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6, Paragraph 19 is added to the Decree as follows: 
19. That each of the parties shall bear their own 
costs and expenses incurred in this case including 
attorney's fees other than is hereinabove set forth. 
That all other terms, provisions and conditions of the Decree 
of Divorce shall remain in full force and effect to the extent the 
same are not in conflict herewith. 
DATED this ^ ^ S a y of ^ ^ ^ v Z x ^ I ^ ^ 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
DAVID S. Y 
District J 
^ C O U N T Y ^ / 
'"'Milium**** 
?fih~. 
E l l e n Ma 
Attorneys/tor Defendant 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
L/a, 
Dean C. Andreasen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the £(&lL day of September 1994, I 
caused the foregoing Amended Decree of Divorce to be hand-delivered 
to the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West 300 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(4^,.^L (A&£L 
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U.C.A. SEC. 30-3-35 MINIMUM SCHEDULE FOR VISITATION 
(Summarized) 
Effective May 3, 1993 
Reasonable Visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. If they are not able 
to agree, the definition for school-age children (beginning kindergarten) will be as follows: 
Midweek: 
Alternate Weekends: 
One weekday evening specified from 5:30 - 8:30 p.m. 
Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m. 
Holidays take presedence over the weekend visitarion and weekend schedule doesn't 
change. 
Holiday Visitation: (6:00 p.m. day before holiday to 7:00 p.m. day of unless 
specified otherwise) 
Odd Numbered Years 
Human Rights Day 
Easter from Fri. 6:00 p.m. to Sun 7:00 p.m. 
Memorial Day Fri. 6:00 p.m. 
to Mon. 7:00 p.m. 
July 24th to 11:00 p.m. 
Veteran's Day 
Day before or after Child's Birthday 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 
First Half Christmas Vacation, including 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 
to 1:00 p.m. 
Even Numbered Years 
New Year's Day 
President's Day 
July 4th to 11:00 p.m. 
Labor Day from Fri. 6:00 to Mon. 7:00 p.m. 
Columbus Day 
UEA weekend from Wed. 6:00 p.m. to 
Sun. 7:00 p.m. 
Child's Actual Birthday to 9:00 p.m. 
Thanksgiving from Wed 7:00 p.m. to 
Sun. 7:00 p.m. 
Second Half Christmas Vacation 1:00 p.m. 





With Father 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
With Mother 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
4 weeks during summer or, if year round, 1/2 school breaks, 
custodial parent allowed two weeks uninterputed. Notification of 
summer visitation or vacation weeks with children should be 
provided in writing to the other parent at least 30 days in advance. 
Contact at reasonable hours 
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EXHIBIT A 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit "5" Judged Ruling. June 15. 1994 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 





CIVIL NO. D-89-431-0482 
JUDGE'S RULING 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON WEDNESDAY, THE 15TH DAY 
OF JUNE, 1994, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 3:20 O'CLOCK 
P.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE HONOR-
ABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 1 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ELLEN MAYCOCK 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
EIGHTH FLOOR, BANK TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: CLARK W. SESSIONS 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
ONE UTAH CENTER 
THIRTEENTH FLOOR 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
* * * 
I N D E X 
JUDGE'S RULING PAGE 3 
* * * 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, ALL RIGHT. I'VE HAD THE 
BENEFIT OF HEARING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PARTIES NOW FOR TWO 
DAYS AND I WANT TO MAKE A COUPLE OF PRELIMINARY COMMENTS 
PRIOR TO RULING. 
I'VE ALREADY MADE THE COMMENT THAT I REALLY DO 
BELIEVE THAT BOTH OF YOU NEED TO HAVE THE ATTITUDE THAT YOU 
WANT THE CHILDREN TO HAVE AS GOOD A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
OTHER PARENT AS YOU REALLY WANT THEM TO HAVE WITH YOURSELF. 
AND THAT ATTITUDE CAN ONLY BE EXPRESSED THROUGH YOUR CON-
DUCT, THROUGH THE WAY YOU TREAT EACH OTHER, THROUGH THE WAY 
YOU DEAL WITH THE CHILDREN. AND UNLIKE ANY OTHER ORDER 
THAT A COURT EVER ENTERS, IF I ENTER A JUDGMENT AGAINST 
SOMEBODY IT IS A REAL AND FIXED ORDER. IT IS ESTABLISHED. 
BUT A CUSTODY ORDER, OR A VISITATION ORDER, IS CONSTANTLY 
SUBJECT TO CHANGE AND MODIFICATION. IT HAS TO BE DEALT 
WITH IN THE FUTURE. IT IS A PRESENT ORDER DEALING WITH 
FUTURE EVENTS. AND THE PROBLEM WITH IT IS THAT ALMOST NO 
MATTER WHAT I DECIDE, DEPENDING UPON HOW THE PARTIES WISH 
TO IMPLEMENT THE ORDER, IT WILL MAKE THE DECISION OF THE 
JUDGE RIGHT OR WRONG. IN OTHER WORDS, WHATEVER I DECIDE, 
IF YOU IMPLEMENT IT WELL, IT MAKES IT RIGHT; WHATEVER I 
DECIDE, IF YOU IMPLEMENT IT POORLY, IT MAKES IT WRONG. 
NOW, IN 1991 THE DISTRICT COURT STATED THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF, THEN MS. SIGG, WAS AWARDED PERMANENT CARE, 
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CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILDREN. NOW I'M AWARE 
THAT THAT ORDER WAS MODIFIED IN PART AS TO THE VISITATION 
WITH THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER, BUT THERE SHALL BE RESERVED IN 
THE DEFENDANT REASONABLE RIGHTS OF VISITATION WHICH WILL BE 
CONSISTENT WITH THOSE RIGHTS OF VISITATION WHICH HAVE BEEN 
EXERCISED BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THESE 
ACTIONS: EVERY OTHER WEEKEND, EVERY TUESDAY AND THURSDAY 
AND SO ON. 
AND THEN IT TALKS ABOUT IN THE EVENT THE PLAIN-
TIFF DETERMINES TO GO TO NEW ZEALAND. 
THEN IT SAYS LATER THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE ENTI-
TLED, IN THE EVENT THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT MOVE OUTSIDE THE 
STATE OF UTAH, THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE ENTITLED TO FOUR 
WEEKS OF VISITATION DURING THE SUMMER FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
EXERCISING VACATION. 
AND THEN IT SAYS THE PARTIES SHALL FREELY AND 
OPENLY COMMUNICATE REGARDING ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. THERE SHALL BE RESERVED IN 
THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE AND REVIEW THE SCHOOLING 
AND ACADEMIC RECORDS OF THE CHILDREN, ALL MEDICAL AND 
DENTAL RECORDS AND ALL SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS RECORDS OF 
IMPORTANCE. IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE DUPLICATE RECORDS ARE 
NOT PROVIDED BY THE CHILDRENS« SCHOOL OR MEDICALS PROVIDED 
THE PLAINTIFF WILL FORWARD COPIES OF THOSE RECORDS TO THE 
DEFENDANT, SUCH AS THE CHILDRENS' REPORT CARDS, PARENT/ 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 4 
TEACHER NOTICES. THE DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO SCHOOL AND MEDICAL RECORDS AND SO ON. 
WELL, IN THIS CASE THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT CONTINUED TO ESTABLISH A HEALTHY PARENTAL 
RELATIONSHIP IN THE DEFENDANT, AND BY DOING THAT HAS CREAT-
ED SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO THE DEFENDANT EXERCISING HIS 
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF VISITATION. 
LET ME GO THROUGH EACH ISSUE IN THE ORDER WHICH 
THEY WERE ARGUED. 
FIRST IN RELATION TO THE ISSUE OF ALIMONY. THE 
COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND MR. VIC HAYNES ENTERED 
INTO A COHABITATION RELATIONSHIP AS OF THE END OF FEBRUARY, 
1993. THAT THEY, IN EFFECT, RESIDED TOGETHER THEREAFTER, 
EVEN THOUGH FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME THEY HAD SEPARATE 
CONDOMINIUMS, THEY MAINTAINED AN ON-GOING SEXUAL RELATION-
SHIP AS CANDIDLY ACKNOWLEDGED, THEY SHARED EXPENSES, THEY 
SHARED OPEN ACCESS TO EACH OTHER'S PROPERTY, TO EACH 
OTHER'S CONDOMINIUM AND LIVED AS THOUGH THEY MIGHT OTHER-
WISE HAVE BEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. THEY SPENT TIME AT EACH 
OTHER'S CONDOMINIUMS, PRINCIPALLY AT HERS, HE CARRIED A KEY 
TO IT OR HAD ACCESS ALWAYS BY THE HIDDEN KEY. THEY ATE 
MEALS TOGETHER, THEY SHARED EXPENSES WITH FOOD, HE PARKED 
HIS CAR THERE ON OCCASION BUT HE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO OTHER-
WISE WALK THERE FROM HIS OWN CONDOMINIUM. SO THERE WILL BE 
NO ALIMONY DUE AFTER THE END OF FEBRUARY, 1993. 
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AS TO THE UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES THE DIVORCE 
DECREE REQUIRES MR. SIGG TO MAINTAIN THE MEDICAL INSURANCE 
WITH A $250.00 DEDUCTIBLE. THAT'S WHAT THEY AGREED TO. 
ALL RIGHT NOW, THAT WAS THE DECREE. CERTAINLY, IF HE 
WISHES, HE CAN HAVE A $1,000.00 DEDUCTIBLE TO MAKE THE 
DIFFERENCE OR THE PREMIUM REDUCED BY A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT, 
AND HE SHALL PAY THE FIRST $750.00 SO THAT HE, IN ESSENCE, 
IS PAYING THE DEDUCTIBLE. ALL RIGHT? AND THEREAFTER THEY 
SHALL BEAR ALL UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES EQUALLY. 
NOW IF SHE CAN GET MEDICAL INSURANCE THROUGH HER 
EMPLOYMENT AT A BETTER OR REDUCED RATE SHE SHOULD DO THAT 
AND THE—IF IT IS AT NO EXPENSE SHE SHOULD DO THAT AND SAVE 
THE EXPENSE TO HIM. HE SHOULD THEN INSURE THE EXCESS 
COVERAGE. ALL RIGHT? 
THE COURT FINDS AS TO THE DAY CARE COSTS THAT THE 
DAY CARE COSTS WERE NOT ALL INCURRED AS A LEGITIMATE COST 
OF DAY CARE FOR CARING FOR THE CHILDREN WHILE THE MOTHER 
WAS OTHERWISE WORKING, THAT MANY OF THE DECISIONS IN RELA-
TION TO THE DAY CARE COSTS WERE REALLY NOT NECESSARY EVEN 
THOUGH I RECOGNIZE THAT SHE COULD NOT WORK AS FULLY OUT OF 
A HOME WITH THE CHILD PRESENT AS SHE MIGHT BE ENGAGED WITH-
OUT THE CHILD BEING PRESENT. NOW I HAVE NO GREAT BASIS TO 
DETERMINE UPON WHICH, HOW MUCH OF THIS SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT 
BE ALLOWED, AND SO I'M GOING TO MAKE A DECISION THAT ONE-
THIRD OF THE AMOUNT IS TO BE THE MOTHER'S COSTS SOLELY, AND 
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THE PARTIES ARE TO DIVIDE THE REMAINDER. NOW, OF COURSE, 
I'M EXCLUDING FROM THAT THE MARGARET BRAAE COST WHICH I 
THINK WAS INAPPROPRIATE TO BE REQUESTED AND WAS DELETED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF IN HER OWN TESTIMONY. ALL RIGHT? 
NOW AS TO THE FEES AND EXPENSES THAT HAVE BEEN 
INCURRED. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT, MR. SIGG, 
WAS PLACED IN AN EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT POSITION TO 
ASSERT HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS OF VISITATION AND THAT HE SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN SO PLACED AND THAT THE MOTHER—THAT THAT 
CONDUCT WAS SO EXTREME IN THIS CASE THAT IT JUSTIFIES 
HAVING THE PLAINTIFF, MRS. SIGG, BEAR SOME OF HIS EXPENSES. 
ON EXHIBIT, DEFENDANT'S 2, THE COURT FINDS THAT ITEMS ONE 
AND TWO SHALL BE BORNE EXCLUSIVELY BY MR. SIGG AND ITEMS 
THREE AND FOUR SHALL BE BORNE EXCLUSIVELY BY MRS. SIGG. 
THAT IS, SHE SHALL PAY THE BOULDER CRIMINAL COSTS AND 
EXPENSES INCURRED OVER THERE, SHE SHALL PAY FOR THE PETI-
TION TO MODIFY, THE ATTORNEY'S FEES OF MR. SESSIONS, WHICH 
IS THE AMOUNT OF $9,302.48. 
NOW, MR. SESSIONS, I NOTE THAT SAYS THROUGH MAY 
31ST. THERE MAY BE SOME ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS. I WILL ALLOW 
YOU TO SUBMIT TO ME AN AFFIDAVIT IN THAT REGARD AND I WILL 
DETERMINE WHETHER ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS SHOULD BE ADDED TO 
THAT. 
MR. SESSIONS: WE WILL DO THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE WHOLE OF THE COST 
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OF ELIZABETH STEWART'S EXPENSE OF $2,900.00 PLUS HER TESTI-
MONY SHALL BE BORNE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE. 
OTHER THAN THOSE FEES EACH SHALL BEAR THEIR OWN 
COSTS IN ADDITION THERETO. 
NOW AS TO THIS ISSUE OF CUSTODY. OBVIOUSLY THIS 
IS THE MOST BURDENSOME ISSUE THAT A COURT DEALS WITH IN A 
CASE LIKE THIS AND IT IS PATHETIC THAT IT HAD TO COME BACK 
TO ME UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. AS A MATTER OF FACT, 
WHATEVER I DECIDE, LIKE I SAID EARLIER, IS GOING TO HAVE TO 
BE APPLIED HEREAFTER. IT DOESN'T START HERE BEFORE. IT'S 
HEREAFTER. THERE HAS TO BE A COMPLETE CHANGE OF HEART IN 
THE WAY THAT YOU EACH DEAL WITH EACH OTHER. 
MR. HAYNES IS TO BE EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED, MS. SIGG, 
FROM ANY INVOLVEMENT WHATSOEVER. HE COULD BE ACCUSED OF 
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE SHOULD HE CONVERSE IN ANY RESPECT OR 
INTERFERE IN ANY RESPECT. AND SO HE SHOULD BE SO ADVISED 
OF THAT BY YOU. THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT HE CAN'T ACCEPT A 
TELEPHONE CALL AND BE COURTEOUS, THAT DOESN'T MEAN THAT HE 
CAN'T REFER CALLS TO THE CHILDREN, AS HE SHOULD. 
THE CHILDREN SHOULD HEREAFTER HAVE COMPLETE AND 
OPEN ACCESS TO BOTH PARENTS BY TELEPHONE. ALL PRIVATE 
NUMBERS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CHILDREN AND TO THE OTHER 
PARTY. ANY NUMBERS IN YOUR RESPECTIVE RESIDENCES SHOULD 
ALWAYS BE KNOWN BY THE OTHER PARTY. 
NOW EACH OF YOU IS EXPECTED TO ONLY MAKE 
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EMERGENCY CALLS AT UNUSUAL HOURS. IF THE CHILDREN ARE 
INJURED OR SOMETHING AND YOU HAVE TO MAKE A CALL AT 1:00 
O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING YOU MAKE IT AT 1:00 O'CLOCK IN THE 
MORNING. BUT THAT IS ONLY AN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCE; IT'S 
NOT A NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCE. CALLS SHOULD BE MADE AT NORMAL 
TIMES. 
COURT FINDS THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE IN THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS TO THE VISITATION. THE COURT HAS 
REVIEWED THE FINDINGS OF DR. STEWART AND HER RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND SPECIFICALLY ADOPTS THE FINDINGS IN RELATION TO 
THE LEGAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED, ONE THROUGH FIVE THAT 
ARE WRITTEN ON PAGES THREE AND FOUR OF HER REPORT, AND 
ADOPTS REALLY ALL OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT SHE HAS MADE 
AS THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THAT RECOMMENDATION IS WELL-
FOUNDED IN FACT, THAT THERE HAS BEEN A FLAGRANT DISREGARD 
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE FATHER BY THE MOTHER IN THIS CASE AND 
A DESIRE TO NOT BE FLEXIBLE AS SHE TESTIFIED, TO NOT BE 
COOPERATIVE AS SHE TESTIFIED, TO NOT BE SUPPORTIVE AS SHE 
TESTIFIED. SHE SADLY MISSED THE MARK IN THAT REGARD. 
AS A RESULT OF THAT THE COURT FINDS THAT THE 
CHILDREN SHOULD BE CHANGED IN THEIR CUSTODY FROM THE MOTHER 
TO THE FATHER AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE VISITATION THAT 
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY GRANTED BY THE FATHER TO THE MOTHER 
WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A SIGNIFICANT SUMMER VISITATION WITH 
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THE MOTHER THIS SUMMER, THAT THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE EN-
ROLLED IN THE PARK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT DURING THE NEXT 
ACADEMIC YEAR RESIDING WITH THE FATHER. 
AND I'M GOING TO TELL YOU THAT I REALLY BELIEVE 
THAT BOTH OF YOU BETTER PUT BEHIND YOU THE BITTERNESS AND 
THE HOSTILITY AND BE WILLING HEREAFTER TO RECOGNIZE THAT IF 
THE CHILDREN SHOULD LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER NEXT YEAR OR 
EVEN DURING THE YEAR, MR. SIGG, DON'T INVEST YOUR EMOTION 
TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE CHILDREN. LET THE CHANGE OCCUR 
AS IT OUGHT TO. CHILDREN CAN AND OUGHT TO AND USUALLY DO 
LIVE WITH OTHER PARENTS DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR YOUTH 
WHEN THERE IS A DIVORCE. THERE IS NO REASON TO THINK THAT 
THEY SHOULDN'T LIVE WITH THEIR FATHER FOR A SIGNIFICANT 
PERIOD OF TIME AND WITH THEIR MOTHER FOR A SIGNIFICANT 
PERIOD OF TIME HEREAFTER. BUT I EXPECT YOU TO WORK IT OUT. 
THE VISITATION SCHEDULE INCORPORATED BY THE 
COMMISSIONERS OF THIS DISTRICT SHALL BE ADOPTED AS THE 
VISITATION SCHEDULE, BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT A SPECIFIC 
VISITATION SCHEDULE IS NECESSARY. I THINK YOU OUGHT TO 
VIEW THAT AS A MINIMUM AND YOU OUGHT TO BE PURSUING MUCH 
GREATER ACCESS TO BOTH PARENTS. 
NOW I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW SAD I FEEL THAT THIS 
THING HAS HAD TO BE BROUGHT TO ME, BECAUSE FOR ME TO HAVE 
TO MAKE THIS DECISION RATHER THAN FOR YOU TO HAVE TO MAKE 
THIS DECISION SHOWS A SIGNIFICANT IMMATURITY AND A SAD 
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SITUATION FOR THESE TWO GIRLS WHO, I'M HEARTENED TO NOTE, 
HAVE BEEN VERY, VERY SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL 
MENTAL ATTITUDES, SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, ADJUSTMENTS. 
NOW, MR. SESSIONS, I AM GOING TO ASK YOU TO 
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT. IS THERE ANYTHING LEFT THAT 
NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED OR RESOLVED? 
MR. SESSIONS: I KNOW OF NOTHING, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MS. MAYCOCK? 
MS. MAYCOCK: I CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING, YOUR 
HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU EACH. COURT'S IN RECESS. 
MR. SESSIONS: THANK YOU. 
MS. MAYCOCK: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
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I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
~ EILEEtf'M. AMBROSE", C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: I ~-~ ^ll'2lJSL ~ l'.\-~! 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
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